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I. INTRODUCTION 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to 
a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.1 
Those who have experienced the full thrust of the power of government when leveled 
against them know that the only protection the citizen has is in the requirement for 
a fair trial.2 
[I]nvoluntary medication with antipsychotic drugs poses a serious threat to a de-
fendant’s right to a fair trial.3 
 
On July 24, 1998, Russell Weston shot and killed two police 
officers, and wounded a third, near a security checkpoint in the 
United States Capitol building.4 Reportedly, Weston’s goal was to 
gain access to the “override console” of the “ruby satellite system,” a 
time machine located in the “great safe of the U.S. Senate,” so that 
he could prevent “cannibals” from taking over and spreading “black 
heva,” a deadly plague.5 A federal prison psychiatrist diagnosed 
Weston as suffering from schizophrenia,6 and the D.C. District 
                                                                                                                       
1.  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). 
2.  Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 651 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
3.  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
4.  United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
5.  United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring). 
6.  Id. at 11 (per curiam). “Schizophrenia is the paradigmatic illness of psychiatry. It is a 
clinical syndrome of variable but profoundly disruptive psychopathology, which involves thought, 
perception, emotion, movement, and behavior. The expression of these symptoms varies across 
patients and over time, but the cumulative effect of the illness is always severe and usually long 
lasting.” Robert W. Buchanan, M.D. & William T. Carpenter, Jr., M.D., Schizophrenia: Introduc-
tion and Overview, in KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1096, 
1096 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000). 
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Court found him incompetent to stand trial.7 A person is competent 
to stand trial so long as he has “sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understand-
ing” and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceed-
ings against him.”8 This competency requirement is based on the 
recognition that in an adversary system of justice, it is unfair to 
convict someone who is unable to defend himself.9 Although treat-
ment with psychotropic medications10 can sometimes render an in-
                                                                                                                       
7.  Weston, 206 F.3d at 11 (per curiam).   
8.  Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (quoting statement of the solicitor 
general); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“[A] person whose mental condi-
tion is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings 
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected 
to a trial.”). The prohibition against bringing an incompetent defendant to trial has been traced 
to English common law. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356 (1996) (“The prohibition 
against trying the incompetent defendant was well established by the time Hale and Blackstone 
wrote their famous commentaries.” (citations omitted)). Federal and state statutes now specify 
standards for determining competency to stand trial. See BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO 
REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 293 n.164 (1997) (noting that “Dusky is followed in sub-
stance by all jurisdictions, although statutory terminology varies widely”). Incompetence to stand 
trial is not synonymous with mental illness; a person can be mentally ill, yet still competent to 
stand trial. See Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1968) (“One may be suffering 
from a mental disease . . . and simultaneously have a rational and factual understanding of court 
proceedings and be able to consult with a lawyer on a reasonably rational basis.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
9.  See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171-72 (noting that “the prohibition [against bringing an incom-
petent defendant to trial] is fundamental to an adversary system of justice”); see also Caleb 
Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 
834 (1960) (arguing that “the mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present in the 
courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself”), quoted in Drope, 420 U.S. at 
171. 
10. Drugs that are used to treat mental illnesses are called “psychotropic.” See Rennie v. 
Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 839 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The term ‘psychotropic’ medication refers generally 
to drugs used in treating psychiatric problems.”). Different kinds of psychotropic drugs are often 
referred to in terms of the particular disorder they are used to treat. For example, psychotropic 
drugs that are used to treat psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia are usually called “antip-
sychotic.” See GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 305 (8th ed. 2001) 
(noting that schizophrenia can be treated with “medications collectively referred to as antipsy-
chotic drugs”). The effectiveness of all psychotropic medications is limited to alleviating the 
symptoms of disorders such as schizophrenia; presently, no pharmacological treatments are 
capable of curing mental illnesses. See id. (noting that antipsychotic medications are not a cure); 
see also SUSAN NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 359-60 (2d ed. 2001) (“People with 
schizophrenia typically must take neuroleptic drugs prophylactically—that is, all the time to 
prevent new episodes of acute symptoms.”). 
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competent detainee competent,11 Weston refused to take these 
medications voluntarily.12 
For more than three years, the federal courts in the District 
of Columbia struggled with the question of whether Weston could 
be compelled to take psychotropic medications involuntarily.13 The 
                                                                                                                       
11. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2001). (“There is treatment 
available for Weston’s illness and its symptoms in the form of antipsychotic medication. The 
parties agree that such medication is likely the only treatment that can mitigate his schizophre-
nia and attendant delusions, and thus restore his competence to stand trial.” (citation omitted)). 
12. See id. (“Weston is not currently receiving any such [antipsychotic] medication because, 
at a time when he was considered medically competent to make a determination, he refused 
them.”). Competence to refuse medical treatment is a separate legal issue from competence to 
stand trial. Cf. State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 969 (Conn. 1995) (noting the “unusual circum-
stance in which a trial court finds that a defendant, although incompetent to stand trial, is com-
petent to make his own health care decisions”). In this Note, the term “competence” refers to 
competence to stand trial, unless otherwise indicated. 
13. See Weston, 255 F.3d at 873 (affirming district court’s decision); United States v. Wes-
ton, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (reversing district court’s decision); United 
States v. Weston, 194 F.3d 145, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dismissing appeal when government with-
drew opposition to finding detainee incompetent to stand trial); United States v. Weston, 134 F. 
Supp. 2d 115, 138 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding involuntary medication justified to decrease dangerous-
ness to others and render detainee competent to stand trial); United States v. Weston, 69 F. 
Supp. 2d 99, 118 (D.D.C. 1999)  (finding involuntary medication justified to decrease dangerous-
ness to self and others); United States v. Weston, 55 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 1999) (remanding 
warden’s decision allowing involuntary medication for further proceedings); United States v. 
Weston, 36 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D.D.C. 1999) (granting prosecution’s motion to compel a psychiat-
ric examination of the detainee by a government expert). 
“Involuntarily” is used in this Note to mean administered under the authority of the court 
without the consent of the detainee, rather than administered with force or following a physical 
struggle. Thus, a detainee may take medications cooperatively yet still involuntarily. See Garcia, 
658 A.2d at 952 n.8 (“[A]n improper court order with which the defendant complies is no less an 
invasion of his rights than physically forcing compliance with such an improper order. . . . [W]e 
see no basis, therefore, for distinguishing between forced medication, whereby the defendant is 
restrained and injected, and medication pursuant to a court order with which the defendant 
complies.”). But see Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 151 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that defendant was not necessarily “forced” to take medication, despite the trial court’s 
refusal to allow him to discontinue the medication); United States v. Arena, No. 00CR398(JFK), 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17522, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2001) (“The Court finds the distinction 
between involuntary and forced medication significant.”). A gray area does exist when the gov-
ernment initiates medication, yet the detainee does not object. Only a few courts have held that 
when the government initiates medication, it thereby assumes the burden of proving that the 
medication will not unjustifiably compromise the detainee’s rights. See, e.g., Rickman v. Dutton, 
864 F. Supp. 686, 713 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (“Upon its own initiation, the State of Tennessee de-
cided to administer the drugs . . . to [defendant] throughout his trial. Accordingly, the burden 
was on the State to demonstrate that the administration of such drugs was medically appropri-
ate, and was essential to promote a compelling State interest.” (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 
U.S. 127, 138 (1992))). Most courts require that a detainee affirmatively object to the medication; 
otherwise, the court will assume the detainee took the medication voluntarily. See, e.g., People v. 
Jones, 931 P.2d 960, 980 (Cal. 1997) (observing that “the holding in Riggins v. Nevada does not 
apply in the present case, because defendant did not refuse the medication and was not forced to 
take the antipsychotic drug” (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127)); Commonwealth v. O’Donnell, 740 
2002] TRIAL RIGHTS AND PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS 169 
government argued that the medications were necessary both to 
prevent Weston from harming himself and others and also to render 
Weston competent to stand trial.14 Weston’s attorneys argued that 
compelling Weston to take psychotropic medications would violate 
Weston’s liberty interest in refusing medical treatment and his 
right to a fair trial.15 
As Weston’s case illustrates, determining whether to allow 
the administration of involuntary psychotropic medications to an 
incompetent pretrial detainee requires a court to consider multiple 
interests of both the detainee and the government. In the absence of 
clear guidance from the Supreme Court,16 lower courts have 
reached various conclusions about when the government’s interests 
justify compelling a detainee to take psychotropic medications.17 
Although preventing a detainee from harming himself or others 
generally has been considered sufficient to justify administering 
involuntary medications,18 some courts have found that rendering a 
detainee competent to stand trial also justifies involuntary medica-
tions.19 Other courts, however, have determined that the govern-
ment’s interest in rendering a detainee competent does not justify 
involuntary medications.20 Additionally, some courts have held that 
whether involuntary medications will violate a detainee’s right to a 
                                                                                                                       
A.2d 198, 210 (Pa. 1999) (“Here, unlike in Riggins, Appellant never moved to suspend the ad-
ministration of her . . . medication.”). 
14. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 116. 
15. Id. Commentators have suggested that Weston himself most likely has argued that 
medication is not necessary because he is not suffering from a psychological disorder. See, e.g., E. 
Fuller Torrey & Mary T. Zdanowicz, Let Us Treat Them Now, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2000, at A23 
(“Weston would never take medication voluntarily because he did not believe he was sick. He 
really believed—and presumably still believes—that there is a ‘ruby red satellite’ in the U.S. 
Capitol that can be used to reverse time.”). This lack of insight is observed in many people with 
schizophrenia. See id.; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 304 (4th ed., text revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR] (“A majority of 
individuals with schizophrenia have poor insight regarding the fact that they have a psychotic 
illness.”).  
16. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
17. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
18. See cases cited infra note 89; see also infra note 24 (discussing government’s interest in 
administering involuntary medications to decrease dangerousness). 
19. E.g., United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (basing decision to al-
low involuntary medication solely on the government’s interest in rendering the detainee compe-
tent to stand trial); Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 168-69 (D.C. 1992) (as amended on 
rehearing) (finding that the government’s interest in rendering the detainee competent justified 
administering involuntary medications). 
20. E.g., Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1511 (D. Utah 1993) (finding that the gov-
ernment’s interest in rendering the detainee competent did not justify administering involuntary 
medications); United States v. Santonio, No. 2100-CR-90C, 2001 WL 760932, at *6 (D. Utah May 
3, 2001) (same). 
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fair trial must be determined before the medications are adminis-
tered.21 Conversely, some courts have held that involuntary medica-
tions may be administered to an incompetent pretrial detainee 
without first determining whether the medications will unjustifia-
bly infringe his fair trial rights.22 
This Note proposes that the best way to resolve this confu-
sion is for courts to decide that government interests cannot justify 
administering involuntary psychotropic drugs to a defendant during 
trial. In general, administering involuntary psychotropic drugs in-
fringes an individual’s interest in refusing medical treatment,23 but 
can be justified by several government interests, particularly the 
interest in preventing the individual from harming himself or oth-
ers.24 During a trial, however, administering involuntary psycho-
tropic drugs infringes not only the interest in refusing medical 
treatment, but also the right to a fair trial, which cannot be justi-
fied by any government interest.25 
                                                                                                                       
21. E.g., United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (requiring 
“pre-medication resolution of the Sixth Amendment issue”); United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 
947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998) (requiring consideration of the potential effects on the defendant’s fair 
trial rights before allowing involuntary medications). 
22. E.g., Weston, 255 F.3d at 876 (deferring issue of trial rights until after medications are 
administered); United States v. Arena, No. 00CR398(JFK), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17522, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2001) (ordering involuntary medications without any discussion of trial 
rights); see also cases cited infra note 89 (allowing involuntary medications despite the absence 
of a determination that the medications would not infringe upon the detainee’s trial rights). 
23. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“The principle that a 
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical 
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”).  
24. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (“The state has a legitimate interest 
under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emo-
tional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to 
protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”); Steele v. 
Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ohio 2000) (“One state interest 
that is sufficiently compelling to override an individual’s decision to refuse antipsychotic medica-
tion is the state’s interest in preventing mentally ill persons from harming themselves or oth-
ers.”); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (holding that “the Due Process 
Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsy-
chotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is 
in the inmate’s medical interest”).   
25. See discussion infra Parts III, IV; cf. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]nvoluntary medication with antipsychotic drugs poses a 
serious threat to a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”); Weston, 206 F.3d at 12 (per curiam) (“Invol-
untary antipsychotic medication has the potential to adversely affect the defendant’s ability to 
obtain a fair trial as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment.” (citing United States v. Brandon, 
158 F.3d 947, 954 (6th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 264-65 (4th Cir. 
1999))); State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 973 (Conn. 1995) (“[A]lthough antipsychotic drugs can 
have beneficent effects upon the mentally ill, their side effects also can compromise a criminal 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association for 
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As background, Part II of this Note discusses recent cases re-
lating to the administration of involuntary psychotropic medica-
tions to an incompetent pretrial detainee. Two cases examined in 
detail are United States v. Weston, decided by the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the second time last July,26 and Riggins v. Ne-
vada, the Supreme Court case that has come the closest to ruling on 
the issue of administering involuntary psychotropic drugs to incom-
petent pretrial detainees.27 Part III discusses the ways that invol-
untary psychotropic drugs violate the right to a fair trial, including 
diminishing the defendant’s ability to exercise procedural rights, 
prejudicing the defendant’s demeanor, and altering evidence of the 
defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense. Part IV consid-
ers counterarguments proposing that involuntary medications do 
not necessarily violate the right to a fair trial. This part explains 
why, despite such potentially curative measures as jury instruc-
tions and expert witnesses, the government cannot administer in-
voluntary psychotropic medications to a defendant during trial 
without undermining the fundamental fairness of the trial. Part V 
proposes that the government should pursue civil commitment 
rather than criminal prosecution of pretrial detainees whose compe-
tence to stand trial depends upon involuntary psychotropic medica-
tions. While criminal convictions usually promote such government 
interests as retribution for past criminal activity and deterrence of 
future criminal activity, these interests are not well served by con-
victing a defendant who has not received a fair trial. Because invol-
untary psychotropic medications pose a substantial threat to the 
fundamental fairness of a criminal trial, prohibiting the govern-
ment from administering these medications to a defendant during 
trial, even if the defendant therefore cannot be brought to trial, re-
sults in the “loss” of interests that could not have been gained in 
the first place.   
                                                                                                                       
Petitioner at 13, Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (No. 90-8466) (noting that involuntary 
medication “may tilt the balance of the adversary system against the accused”).  
26. 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 115 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also 
Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 99 (D.D.C. 1999), rev’d, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
27. 504 U.S. at 127. 
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II. CURRENT CONFUSION ABOUT WHEN THE GOVERNMENT 
MAY ADMINISTER INVOLUNTARY PSYCHOTROPIC 
MEDICATIONS TO AN INCOMPETENT DETAINEE 
A. One “Supreme” Source of Confusion: Riggins v. Nevada 
In 1987, David Riggins was arrested for murder.28 While in 
jail, Riggins complained of “hearing voices” and having difficulty 
sleeping.29 A psychiatrist prescribed psychotropic medications to 
treat these symptoms.30 Despite conflicting opinions from several 
psychiatrists regarding Riggins’s competency, the trial court found 
Riggins competent to stand trial.31 Riggins then asked the trial 
court to allow him to stop taking the medications, arguing that con-
tinuing the medications would compromise his right to a fair trial 
and interfere with his ability to present an insanity defense.32 After 
conducting a hearing, at which several psychiatrists gave conflict-
ing testimony about how discontinuing the medications would affect 
Riggins’s competency to stand trial, the trial court denied Riggins’s 
request.33 The trial court did not, however, explain that its decision 
was based on the need to medicate Riggins to maintain his compe-
tency; in fact, the trial court did not explain its decision at all.34 
A jury found Riggins guilty and sentenced him to death.35 
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, 
rejecting Riggins’s claim that the continued administration of in-
voluntary psychotropic medication had violated his right to a fair 
                                                                                                                       
28. Id. at 129. 
29. Id.   
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 129-30. This point alone has generated confusion. A significant portion of the oral 
argument before the Supreme Court was directed at clarifying whether Riggins needed to be 
medicated to remain competent to stand trial. See U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript, 
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), available at 1992 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 179, at *7-43. Lower 
court cases decided since 1992 have almost universally looked to Riggins when considering 
whether to allow the administration of involuntary medication to an incompetent pretrial de-
tainee. See infra Part II.C (discussing recent cases). Riggins himself, however, was not found 
incompetent to stand trial. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 130.  
32. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 130 (“Relying on both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Nevada 
Constitution, Riggins argued that continued administration of these drugs infringed his freedom 
and that the drugs’ effect on his demeanor and mental state during trial would deny him due 
process. Riggins also asserted that, because he would offer an insanity defense at trial, he had a 
right to show jurors his ‘true mental state.’ ”). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 131. 
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trial.36 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari “to decide 
whether forced administration of antipsychotic medication during 
trial violated rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”37 Finding nothing in the trial court’s record to sug-
gest any consideration of either the defendant’s interests in refus-
ing medication or the government’s interests in continuing medica-
tion, the Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Nevada 
Supreme Court,38 which vacated Riggins’s conviction and ordered a 
new trial.39  
The issue the U.S. Supreme Court actually decided in 
Riggins was somewhat different than the one that it set out to de-
cide. What the Court actually decided was not “whether” admini-
stration of involuntary medication during trial violated rights 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,40 but rather 
that such medication “may well have” violated these rights.41 Be-
cause the trial court had not attempted to justify its decision, the 
only definitive conclusion to be drawn from the Supreme Court’s 
reversal of this decision is that administering involuntary medica-
tions is certain to violate constitutional rights if not justified by any 
government interest. On remand, the Nevada trial court avoided 
the question, left unanswered by the U.S. Supreme Court, of what 
government interests do justify administering involuntary medica-
tions, when Riggins decided to plead guilty.42 For courts that have 
been confronted with detainees who without medications are not 
competent to enter a plea,43 the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                                       
36. Id. at 131-32; see also Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 539 (Nev. 1991) (affirming convic-
tion and sentence). 
37. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 132-33. 
38. Id. at 138. 
39. Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705, 705 (Nev. 1993). 
40. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
41. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137 (“The court did not acknowledge the defendant’s liberty interest 
in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. This error may well have impaired the constitu-
tionally protected trial rights Riggins invokes.”); see also id. at 153 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137): 
We took this case to decide “whether forced medication during trial violates a 
defendant’s constitutional right to a full and fair trial.” Pet. for Cert. The Court 
declines to answer this question one way or the other, stating only that a viola-
tion of Harper “may well have impaired the constitutionally protected trial 
rights Riggins invokes.” 
42. Nevada Briefs, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 22, 1996, at 5B, available at 1996 WL 2343631 
(“Instead of going to trial again, Riggins agreed to plead guilty in April to first-degree murder 
with a deadly weapon and robbery with a deadly weapon. The deal called for Riggins to receive a 
life prison term, either with or without the possibility of parole.”). 
43. A detainee must be competent to enter a plea. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 
448-49 (1992) (“The entry of a plea . . . presupposes that the defendant is competent to stand trial 
and to enter a plea.”). 
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Riggins has generated much confusion about when involuntary 
medications may be administered.44  
One source of confusion in Riggins is the Court’s reliance on 
Washington v. Harper, a prison regulation case decided two years 
earlier.45  This case, as the Riggins Court noted, held that although 
Harper, a convicted prison inmate, did have a liberty interest in 
refusing psychotropic medication, the compromise of that interest 
was justified because Harper had been found to pose a danger to 
himself or others in prison, and because the medication was in 
Harper’s medical interest.46 The Riggins Court did not address, 
though, the important difference between Harper and Riggins: 
unlike Riggins, Harper had already been tried and convicted, and 
thus, the potential of medication to affect the fairness of his trial 
was not an issue.47 Although the Court did observe that “[t]he Four-
teenth Amendment affords at least as much protection to persons 
the State detains for trial” as to convicted prisoners,48 it did not ex-
plicitly consider that pretrial detainees need not only the same level 
of protection but different protections as well, protections that in-
clude the right to due process at trial. The Court’s failure to distin-
guish Riggins from Harper was compounded by its observation that 
the State of Nevada “certainly would have satisfied due process” if 
it had demonstrated that Riggins posed a danger to himself or oth-
ers, that the protection of Riggins and others could not have been 
achieved through a means less intrusive than medication, and that 
                                                                                                                       
44. See infra Parts II.B, C (discussing confusion among lower courts). Some courts have 
noted explicitly the absence of guidance provided by the Riggins decision. See, e.g., Woodland v. 
Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1510 (D. Utah 1993) (observing that, regarding the question of what 
interests of the state might justify involuntary medication, “[t]his is the total of the Riggins 
Court’s guidance on this issue”); Harrison v. State, 635 So. 2d 894, 905 (Miss. 1994) (“[A]lthough 
[Riggins] absolutely mandates that certain findings be made, it does not enlighten as to exactly 
what those findings must be.”); Riggins v. Nevada, 860 P.2d 705, 707 (Nev. 1993) (Springer, J., 
dissenting) (“I . . . find in Riggins v. Nevada very little that will guide state courts as to the 
proper constitutional procedures to be employed in cases involving the forced drugging of crimi-
nal defendants.”); cf. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The 
Court’s opinion will require further proceedings on remand, but there seems to be little discus-
sion about what is to be considered.”). 
45. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133 (“Our discussion in Washington v. Harper provides useful 
background for evaluating [Riggins’s] claim.” (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 
(1990))); Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 (“In Turner v. Safley, we considered various factors to deter-
mine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation. Three are relevant here.” (referring to 
482 U.S. 78 (1987))). 
46. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134-35 (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 227). 
47. Cf. Riggins, 860 P.2d at 708 n.3 (Springer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Supreme Court 
for “treating accused Riggins not as a citizen accused of a crime but as a criminal in ‘penal con-
finement’ ”). 
48. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). 
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the medication was in Riggins’s medical interest.49 Absent from this 
list of factors necessary for satisfying due process, however, is a re-
quirement that the government demonstrate that the medication 
will not violate trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
The Court’s suggestion that virtually the same standard50 
that was appropriate for determining whether to medicate a con-
victed inmate (Harper) was also appropriate for determining 
whether to medicate a pretrial detainee (Riggins) seems to ignore 
the potential of psychotropic medications to abridge the detainee’s 
rights at trial. Yet, the Court did note the possibility that medica-
tion had compromised Riggins’s defense: “It is clearly possible 
that . . . side effects had an impact upon not just Riggins’[s] out-
ward appearance, but also the content of his testimony on direct or 
cross examination, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the sub-
stance of his communication with counsel.”51 This statement, recog-
nizing that psychotropic medications can interfere with the ability 
to present a defense, is not easily reconciled with the statement 
that due process “certainly” would have been satisfied by a stan-
dard that does not include any consideration of how these medica-
tions will affect a defendant’s rights at trial.  
Also uncertain from the Court’s opinion is when, if ever, the 
government’s interest in rendering a detainee competent to stand 
trial can justify involuntary medications. The Court raised but did 
not unambiguously resolve this issue, indicating only that “the 
State might have been able to justify medically appropriate, invol-
untary treatment with the drug by establishing that it could not 
obtain an adjudication of Riggins’[s] guilt or innocence by using less 
intrusive means.”52 This statement has left lower courts wondering 
whether “might” means that, in some cases, the government’s inter-
est in rendering the detainee competent does justify involuntary 
medications, or only that the Supreme Court was declining to de-
cide this issue.53 
                                                                                                                       
49. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 225-26). 
50. The Riggins Court did add a “least intrusive” component to the Harper test, 504 U.S. at 
135, although whether medication is the least intrusive means of achieving the government’s 
interest in preventing the detainee from harming himself or others is not relevant to the issue of 
whether medication compromises the detainee’s right to receive a fair trial. 
51. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137. 
52. Id. at 135 (emphasis added). 
53. See State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 962 (Conn. 1995):  
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court, in using the word “might,” intended 
to reserve the issue of whether the state can justify involuntary treatment to 
restore a defendant to competency for the sole purpose of bringing him to trial, 
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A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy is more clear, both 
in its acknowledgment of the differences between Harper and 
Riggins54 and in its conclusion that a defendant rendered competent 
by involuntary medications cannot be brought to trial if the medica-
tions will preclude him from receiving a fair trial.55 Some lower 
courts, however, have ignored Justice Kennedy’s insights,56 while 
others have either considered yet declined to follow them57 or sug-
gested that they are no longer as relevant as when Riggins was de-
cided.58  
                                                                                                                       
or whether the Court intended the word “might” to indicate that such treatment 
is justified, but only if certain conditions are met.[;] 
see also United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111 (D.D.C. 1999) (“The Riggins Court . . . 
stopped short of articulating either the circumstances under or standard by which the Court 
could medicate a defendant solely to render him competent to stand trial.”). 
54. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“This is not a case 
like Washington v. Harper. . . .”). Interestingly, Justice Kennedy authored the Court’s opinion in 
Harper. 494 U.S. at 213. 
55. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If the defendant 
cannot be tried without his behavior and demeanor being affected in this substantial way by 
involuntary treatment, in my view the Constitution requires that society bear this cost in order 
to preserve the integrity of the trial process.”). 
56. E.g., State v. Kotis, 984 P.2d 78, 90-94 (Haw. 1999) (upholding decision to medicate an 
incompetent pretrial detainee, without reference to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and without 
consideration of the likely effect of psychotropic medications on the detainee’s trial rights).  The 
court concluded that the detainee’s dangerousness was sufficient to justify involuntary medica-
tion: 
In sum, we read Riggins to require the following three findings before a crimi-
nal defendant may constitutionally be involuntarily medicated with antipsy-
chotic drugs, where it is alleged that the medication is necessary because the 
defendant poses a danger to himself or herself or others: (1) that the defendant 
actually poses a danger of physical harm to himself or herself or others; (2) that 
treatment with antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate, that is, in 
the defendant’s medical interest; and (3) that, considering less intrusive alter-
natives, the treatment is essential to forestall the danger posed by the defen-
dant. 
Id. at 93. 
57. E.g., State v. Baker, 511 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Neb. 1994) (“Although there may be situa-
tions where we might agree with Justice Kennedy . . . the present case is not such a situation.” 
(referring to Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145)); State v. Adams, 888 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1995) (“Adams urges this court to follow Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Riggins. . . . We 
reject this invitation . . . .”).   
58. E.g., United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 886 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Antipsychotic 
drugs have progressed since Justice Kennedy discussed their side effects in Riggins.”); United 
States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 134 (D.D.C. 2001) (suggesting that “[a]dvances in the 
primary antipsychotic medications and adjunct therapies make such side effects [as discussed by 
Justice Kennedy] less likely” (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring))). The 
concerns raised in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence are not so easily resolved, however. See infra 
notes 128-36 and accompanying text (discussing newer antipsychotic medications). 
2002] TRIAL RIGHTS AND PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS 177 
B. Highlighting the Confusion: United States v. Weston 
In a case that thus far has generated seven decisions and 
twelve opinions, the federal courts in the District of Columbia have 
recently considered the question of when the government may ad-
minister involuntary psychotropic medications to an incompetent 
pretrial detainee.59 Russell Weston has been charged with premedi-
tated murder, attempted murder, and the use of a firearm in the 
commission of a violent crime.60 Because the district court found 
him incompetent to stand trial,61 Weston was committed to a fed-
eral prison hospital, for the purpose of determining whether he 
could be rendered competent.62 Whether Weston could be rendered 
competent, however, depended upon whether he could be compelled 
to take psychotropic medications.63 
In its initial review, the D.C. District Court found that Wes-
ton posed a safety risk to himself and others, and authorized the 
government to compel him to take psychotropic medications.64 Be-
cause the district court found that the government’s interest in pre-
venting Weston from harming himself and others justified involun-
tary medications, the district court, citing Riggins, did not decide 
whether the interest in rendering Weston competent to stand trial 
would also justify involuntary medications.65 Additionally, the dis-
trict court did not consider the merits of Weston’s argument that 
administering psychotropic drugs would violate his right to a fair 
trial; instead, the district court indicated that this issue was not 
ripe because Weston was not competent to stand trial.66 The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion accompanied by 
three separate concurrences, reversed, and remanded.67  
                                                                                                                       
59. See cases cited supra note 13. 
60. United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 1999). 
61. Id.  
62. Id. at 103. 
63. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text. 
64. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (“The Court has found that the proposed medication is 
medically appropriate and that, considering less intrusive alternatives, it is essential for the 
defendant’s own safety or the safety of others.”). 
65. Id. at 111 (“[The] Riggins [case] indicates that if treatment is justified on dangerousness 
grounds, as it is in the present case, the Court need not reach the issue whether the defendant 
may be treated solely to render him competent to stand trial.”). 
66. Id. at 117 (“[T]he Court does not find that the legal issues of whether the proposed 
treatment will interfere with the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and to a fair 
trial to be ripe at this juncture.” (citation omitted)). 
67. See United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (Henderson, 
Rogers & Tatel, JJ., each concurring separately). 
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On remand, the district court reconsidered two issues: 
whether sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that Wes-
ton was a danger to himself or others, and whether the govern-
ment’s interest in rendering Weston competent to stand trial justi-
fied the possible infringement of Weston’s trial rights.68 The district 
court again found that Weston posed a danger to others.69 The dis-
trict court also found that administering involuntary medications 
would not necessarily deny Weston a fair trial.70 While acknowledg-
ing that psychotropic medications could interfere with Weston’s 
trial rights,71 the district court identified a variety of methods, such 
as jury instructions and expert testimony, that might prevent any 
prejudice caused by the medications from violating these rights.72 
Additionally, the district court observed, citing Riggins, that “an 
essential government interest can sometimes justify trial preju-
dice.”73  
                                                                                                                       
68. United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 116 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Weston, 206 
F.3d at 13-15 (remanding to district court). 
69. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 131 (“[T]he Court is persuaded that the government has pre-
sented additional factual evidence, as well as expert testimony, to support a conclusion that 
Weston is a danger to those around him.”). In considering whether Weston also was a danger to 
himself, the court found that although three years of untreated psychosis had caused Weston’s 
condition to “progress[ ] to the point where Weston is preoccupied and dominated by his delu-
sional system ‘to the exclusion of almost all aspects to existence beyond vegetative functions,’ “ 
(quoting report of psychiatrist), the court was “unaware of authority suggesting that this sort of 
passive deterioration supports a finding of dangerousness to one’s self.” Id. at 127 n.17. “Passive 
deterioration” might support a finding that Weston has become “gravely disabled,” and therefore, 
is a danger to himself. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215 n.3 (1990) (noting that one 
definition of “gravely disabled” is that “a person, as a result of a mental disorder . . . manifests 
severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive 
or volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or 
her health or safety” (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(1) (1987))). Although Weston, in 
seclusion for the past three years, might be receiving the care essential for his physical safety, he 
is certainly not receiving the care essential for his mental health. See Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 
130 (“Seclusion is simply the warehousing of Weston in a psychotic state.”); see also Anne Hull, A 
Living Hell or a Life Saved?, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at A1 (“Because Weston has received no 
treatment and could be dangerous, he has been kept in seclusion for more than two years, an 
unheard-of period of isolation in modern times.”). 
70. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 137 (“There is no reason to conclude, at this time, that invol-
untary medication would preclude Weston from receiving a fair trial.”).   
71. Id. at 132-33 (“Involuntary antipsychotic medication has the potential to adversely af-
fect Weston’s ability to obtain a fair trial. . . . Accordingly, before allowing the government to 
medicate Weston, the Court must consider the potential impact of medication on his fair trial 
rights.” (citation omitted)). 
72. Id. at 137; see also infra note 191 (discussing these measures). The inadequacy of such 
measures is discussed infra Part IV. 
73. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992)). Not 
even an essential government interest, however, can justify the conviction of a defendant at a 
trial that lacks a basic, fundamental level of fairness. See infra notes 254-58 and accompanying 
text. 
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Again, Weston appealed the district court’s ruling allowing 
the government to compel him to take psychotropic drugs. The sec-
ond panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to consider this case 
affirmed the district court’s decision to allow involuntary medica-
tions.74  The court of appeals based its decision, however, solely on 
the government’s interest in rendering Weston competent to stand 
trial,75 and not also (as the district court had) on the interest in 
preventing Weston from harming others.76 Further, the court of ap-
peals did not decide whether the government’s interests justified 
the possible compromise of Weston’s right to a fair trial. Instead, 
the court of appeals essentially repeated what the district court had 
first held more than two years earlier, that the question of whether 
government interests can justify administering involuntary medica-
tions to Weston during trial could be deferred until after Weston 
has been medicated.77  
Thus, after three years of motions, hearings, opinions, and 
appeals,78 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has finally decided79 
that government interests presently justify administering involun-
tary psychotropic medications to render Weston competent to stand 
trial,80 but may or may not justify continuing the medications once 
Weston’s response to them is observed.81 Undoubtedly, certain as-
                                                                                                                       
74. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
75. See id. (affirming “the district court’s conclusion that the government’s interest in ad-
ministering antipsychotic drugs to make Weston competent for trial overrides his liberty inter-
est”). 
76. The court suggested that the first appellate decision might preclude a finding that in-
voluntary medication is justified by the government’s interest in diminishing Weston’s danger-
ousness: 
Absent a showing that Weston’s condition now exceeds the institution’s ability 
to contain it through his present state of confinement, the prior decision ap-
pears to preclude a finding of dangerousness. . . . We need not determine 
whether our concurring colleague’s different interpretation of the previous 
panel’s decision is correct in view of our affirmance of the district court’s com-
petency-for-trial ground of decision.   
Id. at 879 (citing concurring opinion of Rogers, J.) (additional citation omitted). 
77. See id. at 886 n.8 (“Whether antipsychotic medication will impair Weston’s right to a 
fair trial is best determined when the actual effects of the medication are known, that is, after he 
is medicated.”); United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 1999) (“In the event that 
medication successfully renders the defendant competent to stand trial, the Court could then 
reach the defendant’s argument that the Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment will re-
quire a heightened showing before the defendant may be forcibly medicated during the trial.”). 
78. See cases cited supra note 13. 
79. A small possibility exists that this decision is not final, as Weston’s attorneys have filed 
a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. See United States v. 
Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 5, 2001 (No. 01-6161). 
80. Weston, 255 F.3d at 876. 
81. See id. at 883 (noting “agree[ment] with the district court that ‘there is no reason to con-
clude, at this time, that involuntary medication would preclude Weston from receiving a fair 
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pects of this case are somewhat unusual, such as the intense atten-
tion of the national media.82 Nonetheless, United States v. Weston 
reflects the general state of confusion that presently exists about 
when the government may compel an incompetent pretrial detainee 
to take psychotropic medications.83 
C. The Scope of the Confusion: A Survey of Recent Cases 
Recent cases in which a court has been asked to decide 
whether the government may compel an incompetent pretrial de-
tainee to take psychotropic medications reveal two major points of 
disagreement. First, courts disagree about whether a finding that 
medications are necessary to prevent a detainee from harming him-
self or others can justify involuntary medications without consider-
ing the impact of the medications on the detainee’s trial rights.84 
Additionally, courts disagree about whether the government’s in-
terest in rendering a detainee competent to stand trial can justify 
administering involuntary medications when such medications are 
not also necessary to decrease the detainee’s dangerousness.85 
When the government seeks to administer involuntary psy-
chotropic drugs to an incompetent detainee, usually the first (and 
sometimes the only) issue that a court considers is whether the de-
tainee poses a danger to himself or others.86 If the detainee is dan-
                                                                                                                       
trial’ ” (quoting United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 137 (D.D.C. 2001)) (emphasis 
added)).  
82. See, e.g., From the Shootings to the Investigation, WASH. POST, at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/shooting/archives2.htm (linking sto-
ries about the Russell Weston case); Nightline: Insanity in the Courtroom: When Getting Well 
May Be a Death Sentence (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 23, 2001); 20/20: Capitol Gunman 
(ABC television broadcast, Sept. 15, 1999). 
83. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
84. Compare cases cited infra note 89 (allowing involuntary medications based only on a 
finding of dangerousness), with United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per 
curiam) (requiring consideration of both dangerousness and trial rights). 
85. Compare Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 165-66 (D.C. 1992) (as amended on re-
hearing) (finding government’s interest did justify administering involuntary medications to a 
nondangerous detainee), and Weston, 255 F.3d at 876 (same), with Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. 
Supp. 1497, 1519 (D. Utah 1993) (finding government’s interest did not justify administering 
involuntary medications to a nondangerous detainee), and United States v. Santonio, No. 2100-
CR-90C, 2001 WL 760932, at *6 (D. Utah May 3, 2001) (same). 
86. “Danger” is used in this Note to mean that the detainee is a danger to himself or others 
because of a mental illness. Generally, these two criteria will justify involuntary treatment of 
any person, regardless of whether he has been charged with a crime or found incompetent to 
stand trial. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (noting that “the initial inquiry in a 
civil commitment proceeding is . . . [w]hether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to 
either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy . . . .”). 
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gerous, the government can attempt to justify involuntary medica-
tions on the basis of its interest in preventing the detainee from 
harming himself or others.87  In most cases in which a court has 
reviewed the government’s decision to administer involuntary 
medications to an incompetent detainee, the court has found that the 
detainee poses a danger to himself or others.88 Many of these courts 
have held that a finding of dangerousness is sufficient to justify 
compelling an incompetent detainee to take psychotropic drugs.89 
The consequence for the detainee is that he can be compelled to 
take psychotropic medications on the basis of his dangerousness; 
then, if the medications render him competent, he can be brought to 
trial without any consideration of whether government interests 
justify compromising not only his interest in refusing unwanted 
treatment, but also his right to a fair trial.90 
                                                                                                                       
87. See supra note 24 (discussing the government’s parens patriae and police powers).  
88. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 262 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the 
detainee is a danger to self or others); United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 131 (D.D.C. 
2001) (same); United States v. Keeven, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1140 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (same); Peo-
ple v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 176-77 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999), cert. granted, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 4959 
(Colo. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 2001 Colo. LEXIS 778 (Colo. Sept. 17, 2001) (en banc) (same); 
State v. Kotis, 984 P.2d 78, 92-93 (Haw. 1999) (same); State v. Baker, 511 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Neb. 
1994) (same). 
89. See, e.g., Morgan, 193 F.3d at 262 (concluding that “Morgan’s due process rights were 
adequately protected below, in light of the administrative finding that treatment with antipsy-
chotic medication is necessary because Morgan is dangerous to himself and others.”); Keeven, 115 
F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (recommending that “involuntary medication be re-instituted if it is still the 
professional judgment of the medical staff that it is necessary to control [defendant’s] danger-
ousness”); Tally, 7 P.3d at 176-77 (noting that “administration of the drug was specifically found 
to be required to prevent defendant from seriously harming himself or others and to prevent a 
further deterioration in his mental condition”); Kotis, 984 P.2d at 92-93 (“Riggins suggested that, 
although a criminal defendant, like any other mental health patient, possesses a fundamental 
right to refuse treatment threatening his bodily integrity, that right may be overridden by the 
state’s interest in preventing him or her from causing physical harm to self or others.”); Baker, 
511 N.W.2d at 762 (affirming involuntary medication of an incompetent pretrial detainee be-
cause “the evidence demonstrated that appellant was mentally ill and dangerous and that the 
treatment was necessary for the protection of himself as well as others”); cf. Woodland, 820 F. 
Supp. at 1514 n.20 (“A finding that plaintiff presents a danger to himself or others would justify 
the forcible administration of the drugs.” (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 
(1990))). 
90. The question of whether an incompetent pretrial detainee may be compelled to take psy-
chotropic drugs on the basis of dangerousness to self or others when the drugs “might have the 
incidental effect of rendering him competent to stand trial,” Morgan, 193 F.3d at 264, is similar  
in some respects to the question of whether a prisoner sentenced to death can be compelled to 
take psychotropic drugs on the basis of dangerousness when an incidental effect of the drugs 
might be that the prisoner becomes competent to be executed. The Supreme Court has held that 
the government cannot execute an incompetent prisoner. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 
(1986). At least one state supreme court has held that the government cannot administer 
involuntary medications for the sole purpose of rendering a prisoner competent to be executed. 
State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 771 (La. 1992). When the government argues that involuntary 
psychotropic medications are needed to prevent the prisoner from harming himself or others, 
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The government also may seek to administer involuntary 
medications to an incompetent pretrial detainee who is not a dan-
ger to himself or others.91 If a detainee is not dangerous, involun-
tary medications cannot be justified by the government’s interest in 
protecting the health and safety of the detainee or others. Instead, 
the government must justify involuntary medications solely on the 
basis of its interest in rendering the detainee competent to stand 
trial.92  Some courts, applying a strict scrutiny standard of review,93 
                                                                                                                       
ers, rather than solely to render the prisoner competent to be executed, determining whether to 
allow the medications is more complicated. The Eighth Circuit recently decided that it simply 
could not decide whether the government could administer involuntary medications for the pur-
pose of diminishing dangerousness when the medications might also result in competency to be 
executed, and granted a permanent stay of execution. Singleton v. Norris, 267 F.3d 859, 871 (8th 
Cir. 2001). For further discussion of the various issues related to competency to be executed, see 
Roberta M. Harding, “Endgame”: Competency and the Execution of Condemned Inmates—A Pro-
posal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against the Infliction of Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 105 (1994); Paul J. Larkin, The Eighth Amendment 
and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1980); John L. Farringer 
IV, Note, The Competency Conundrum: Problems Courts Have Faced in Applying Different Stan-
dards for Competency to be Executed, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2441 (2001); Rochelle Graff Salguero, 
Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to Be Executed, 96 YALE L.J. 167 (1986). 
91. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 94-97. 
92. Department of Justice regulations suggest that the government may medicate a de-
tainee for the sole purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial. The Bureau of Prisons 
regulations on Medical Services provide that a detainee may be medicated following an adminis-
trative hearing at which “[t]he psychiatrist conducting the hearing shall determine whether 
treatment or psychotropic medication is necessary in order to attempt to make the inmate com-
petent for trial or is necessary because the inmate is dangerous to self or others, is gravely dis-
abled, or is unable to function in the open population of a mental health referral center or a regu-
lar prison.” Administrative Safeguards for Psychiatric Treatment and Medication, 28 C.F.R. § 
549.43(a)(5) (1995). Although this regulation seems to allow administration of involuntary psy-
chotropic medication based solely on a finding that medication is “necessary in order to attempt 
to make the inmate competent for trial,” some courts consider this question unsettled. See, e.g., 
United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 119 (D.D.C. 1999) (“[C]ase law does not clearly indi-
cate whether the government can forcibly medicate a defendant solely to render him competent 
to stand trial.”). Interestingly, this is exactly what the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently 
decided that the government could do. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (affirming district court’s decision allowing involuntary medication, based solely on the 
government’s interest in rendering the detainee competent to stand trial). 
93. Government actions that compromise “nonfundamental” interests are subject to “ra-
tional basis” review. This standard requires a government action to be reasonably related to 
serving a legitimate government interest. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 
(1955) (“We cannot say that the regulation has no rational relation to th[e] [State’s] objective and 
therefore is beyond constitutional bounds.”). Government actions that compromise “fundamen-
tal” interests are reviewed under a “strict scrutiny” standard, which requires that the action be 
narrowly tailored to serving a compelling government interest. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 
900, 920 (1995) (“To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must demonstrate that its . . . legislation is 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.” (citation omitted)); see also Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“This enactment involves what, by common 
understanding throughout the English-speaking world, must be granted to be a most fundamen-
tal aspect of ‘liberty,’ . . . and it is this which requires that the statute be subjected to ‘strict scru-
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have decided that the government’s interest in rendering a nondan-
gerous detainee competent to stand trial does not justify adminis-
tering involuntary medications.94 Other courts, applying an inter-
mediate or “heightened” standard, have reached inconsistent deci-
sions:95 some have allowed involuntary medications96 while some 
have not.97 In Riggins, the Supreme Court expressly declined to ar-
ticulate a standard of review for administering involuntary medica-
tions to a defendant before or during trial; thus, it remains unclear 
what the Court would consider to be the appropriate standard of 
review.98 
                                                                                                                       
tiny.’ ” (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))). Courts have also applied an 
“intermediate” standard of review, which requires government actions to be “substantially re-
lated” to “important government objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To with-
stand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.”). 
94. E.g., United States v. Santonio, No. 2100-CR-90C, 2001 WL 760932, at *4 (D. Utah May 
3, 2001) (indicating that “the court will apply the standard of strict scrutiny to the determination 
of whether Mr. Santonio may be forcibly medicated” and finding involuntary medications not 
justified); cf. United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 957 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that “the gov-
ernment’s request to forcibly medicate Brandon must be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny stan-
dard” and remanding to the district court for further proceedings (citing Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 
1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984))). 
95. These inconsistent decisions reflect, at least to some extent, inconsistent ideas about 
how to define those government interests that are sufficiently important to justify involuntary 
medications. For example, one court found that rendering a detainee, who was charged with 
second-degree murder, competent to stand trial was not a sufficiently important government 
interest, Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1519 n.28 (D. Utah 1993), while another court 
found that rendering a detainee, who was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine, competent 
to stand trial was a sufficiently important government interest, United States v. Arena, No. 
00CR398(JFK), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17522, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2001) (“Over half a ton of 
cocaine is important business and, if the drug laws mean anything, the Government should have 
an opportunity to bring Mr. Arena to trial.”). The problem with a rule that varies the govern-
ment’s ability to administer involuntary medications according to the severity of the offense with 
which the detainee is charged is that not only does the severity of the charged offense correlate 
with the magnitude of the government’s interest in rendering the detainee competent, it also 
correlates with the magnitude of the detainee’s interest in receiving a fair trial. 
96. E.g., Weston, 255 F.3d at 880 (applying a “form of heightened scrutiny” and finding in-
voluntary medications justified); Arena, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17522, at *7 (asserting that “[t]he 
Weston court enunciated the applicable standard: ‘to medicate [a defendant], the government 
must prove that restoring his competence to stand trial is necessary to accomplish an essential 
state policy,’ “ and allowing involuntary medications (quoting Weston, 255 F.3d at 880)). 
97. E.g., Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. at 1519 n.28 (requiring a “compelling or other 
significant interest” and finding involuntary medications not justified).  
98. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 136 (1992) (“We have no occasion to finally prescribe 
. . . substantive standards . . . .”).  The language used by the majority to describe the nature of 
both the defendant’s and the government’s interests is so suggestive of strict scrutiny, however, 
that the dissent insisted that the majority, despite its denial, was indeed adopting such a stan-
dard. Id. at 156 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority replied, “Contrary to the dissent’s under-
standing, we do not ‘adopt a standard of strict scrutiny.’ ” Id. at 136; see also Brandon, 158 F.3d 
at 957 (“On the one hand, the Court [in Riggins] seems to have alluded to a strict-scrutiny ap-
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A more basic problem, however, than courts’ uncertainty 
about the appropriate standard of review, is courts’ failure to con-
sider as two distinct government actions the administration of in-
voluntary psychotropic medications to a detainee who has been con-
victed of a crime, or who has not been charged with a crime, and the 
administration of involuntary psychotropic medications to a defen-
dant who is on trial. Generally, involuntary medications infringe a 
detainee’s interest in refusing medical treatment, which the gov-
ernment’s interests in preventing harm to the detainee and others 
can justify.99 During a trial, however, involuntary medications in-
fringe the detainee’s right to a fair trial, which government inter-
ests cannot justify.100 
III. WHY GOVERNMENT INTERESTS CANNOT JUSTIFY 
ADMINISTERING INVOLUNTARY PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS 
TO A DEFENDANT DURING TRIAL 
A. Background: Effects and Side Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs 
In his concurring opinion in Riggins v. Nevada, Justice Ken-
nedy observed that administering involuntary antipsychotic medi-
cations101 can violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial in two ways: 
                                                                                                                       
proach. . . . On the other hand, the Court’s majority opinion makes it clear that it did not set out 
any standard . . . .”). 
99. See supra note 24 (discussing the government’s parens patriae and police powers).  Al-
though the government’s interest in preventing harm may justify administering involuntary 
medications to an incompetent detainee prior to trial, actually administering the medications 
might require civil commitment proceedings. Under Jackson v. Indiana, the government may 
hold a detainee because he is incompetent to stand trial only until the court determines whether 
the detainee can be rendered competent, or while treatment is being administered to render the 
detainee competent. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). If treatment is being administered not to render a 
detainee competent but to diminish his dangerousness, Jackson may preclude the government 
from continuing to hold the detainee without a civil commitment order. See id. 
100. See discussion infra Parts III, IV. 
101. This part focuses on antipsychotic medications, which are commonly used to treat psy-
chotic disorders such as schizophrenia. See supra note 10. This is because pretrial detainees who 
(1) are incompetent to stand trial, and (2) might be rendered competent by psychotropic drugs, 
are usually suffering from schizophrenia. See, e.g., United States v. Keeven, 115 F. Supp. 2d 
1132, 1133 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (noting diagnosis of schizophrenia); United States v. Weston, 69 F. 
Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 1999) (same); People v. Jones, 931 P.2d 960, 979 (Cal. 1997) (same); 
State v. Baker, 511 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Neb. 1994) (same). While an in-depth discussion of other 
kinds of psychotropic drugs is beyond the scope of this Note, to the extent that other drugs pro-
duce effects and side effects that are similar to those produced by antipsychotic drugs, this dis-
cussion is relevant to cases in which the government seeks to compel a detainee to take antide-
pressant drugs, for example, or antiseizure drugs. See, e.g., Benson v. Terhune, 157 F. Supp. 2d 
1093, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“The drugs taken by petitioner including Valium, Vistaril, and 
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by altering his demeanor and by interfering with his ability to as-
sist his attorney in presenting a defense.102 These violations result 
from the side effects commonly produced by phenothiazines, the 
kind of antipsychotic medication administered to Riggins,103 and 
still the most widely prescribed class of antipsychotic medication.104 
Antipsychotic medications were discovered, somewhat by accident, 
in the 1950s, when a physician observed that administering phe-
nothiazines prior to surgery reduced the amount of anesthesia re-
quired during surgery, because the drugs produced “calmness, con-
scious sedation, and disinterest in and detachment from external 
stimuli.”105 The intended therapeutic effect when prescribed for 
schizophrenia is the alleviation of some of the most disturbing 
symptoms of this disorder, including delusions and hallucina-
tions.106 Psychologists have used the term “positive symptoms” to 
                                                                                                                       
Elavil alter the chemical processes in the mind and may have potential side effects similar to 
those induced by Mellaril and other anti-psychotic drugs (e.g. sedation, drowsiness, agitation, 
aggression, inappropriate behavior, and anxiety).”). For a review of the effects and side effects of 
different kinds of psychotropic drugs, see generally ROBERT M. JULIEN, M.D., PH.D., A PRIMER 
OF DRUG ACTION (9th ed. 2001). 
102. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The drugs can 
prejudice the accused in two principal ways: (1) by altering his demeanor in a manner that will 
prejudice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom, and (2) by rendering him unable or 
unwilling to assist counsel.”). The dissent agreed that administration of psychotropic drugs could 
deprive a defendant of a fair trial, but argued that the evidence did not support a finding that 
the drugs administered to Riggins had actually deprived him of a fair trial. Id. at 154 n.4 (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting). 
103. See id. at 141-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The side effects produced by 
these drugs are discussed in detail infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text. Also, the possibil-
ity exists that Riggins was overmedicated: “If you are dealing with someone very sick then you 
may prescribe up to 800 milligrams which is the dose he had been taking which is very, very 
high. I mean you can tranquilize an elephant with 800 milligrams.” Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143 
(quoting testimony of psychiatrist). Determining an appropriate therapeutic dose of an antipsy-
chotic medication is often a difficult task. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 341 (indicating that 
“most dosage decisions are made on a trial-and-error basis” because “the plasma concentrations 
vary widely among patients given similar amounts of orally-administered neuroleptics”). 
104. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 339 (“The phenothiazines are the most widely used and least 
expensive drugs for treating psychosis.”).  
105. Id. at 336. 
106. Id. at 336-37. The Greek roots of the term “schizophrenia” mean “split mind,” expressing 
the fracturing of psychological functions that are normally integrated, including thoughts, feel-
ings, perceptions, and behaviors. See supra note 6 (describing the symptoms of schizophrenia). 
Two of the defining symptoms of schizophrenia are delusions and hallucinations. Delusions are 
“erroneous beliefs that usually involve a misinterpretation of perceptions or experiences.” DSM-
IV-TR, supra note 15, at 299. Common delusions include delusions of persecution (a person be-
lieves that “he or she is being tormented, followed, tricked, spied on, or ridiculed”) and delusions 
of reference (a person believes that “certain gestures, comments, passages from books, newspa-
pers, song lyrics, or other environmental cues are specifically directed at him or her”). Id. Hallu-
cinations are “sensory experiences in the absence of any stimulation from the environment.” 
DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 285. Among people with schizophrenia, auditory hallucina-
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describe experiences, such as delusions and hallucinations, that 
“reflect an excess or distortion of normal functions.”107 Researchers 
believe that abnormal activity in a particular kind of brain cell 
(neurons activated by the neurotransmitter dopamine) in a particu-
lar area of the brain (the limbic system) is at least partly responsi-
ble for producing many of the positive symptoms of schizophre-
nia.108 All medications that are used to treat schizophrenia have the 
effect of reducing dopamine activity.109  
Although a diagnosis of schizophrenia depends upon the 
presence of positive symptoms,110 the disorder also involves another 
category of symptoms, called “negative symptoms.”111 Negative 
symptoms reflect a “diminution or loss of normal functions.”112 
Common negative symptoms include restrictions in emotional re-
sponsiveness, verbal behavior, social interaction, and motor activ-
ity.113 For most patients, phenothiazines are moderately effective in 
alleviating the positive symptoms of schizophrenia,114 but do not 
improve115 and may even intensify the negative symptoms.116 Addi-
tionally, these drugs produce substantial side effects;117 traditional 
antipsychotic medications are also called neuroleptics, “because 
                                                                                                                       
tions are the most common, and some types of hallucinations, such as hearing a voice speaking 
one’s thoughts, are particularly diagnostic of schizophrenia. See id. at 286. 
107. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 299; see also Billiot v. State, 655 So. 2d 1, 5 (Miss. 1995) 
(noting that “catatonic excitement, delusions, [and] hallucinations” are “positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia”); JULIEN, supra note 101, at 331 (“The positive symptoms are those typical of 
psychosis and include delusions and hallucinations, bizarre behaviors, dissociated or fragmented 
thoughts, incoherence, and illogicality.”). 
108. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 341. 
109. Id. at 356. 
110. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 312 (listing diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia). 
111. Id. at 299. 
112. Id. 
113. See id.; see also State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (noting that 
“the defendant presents primarily negative symptoms” including “flat affect, an inability to en-
gage in goal directed behavior, [and] a poverty of speech”). 
114. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 379-80 (indicating that ten to twenty percent of patients 
do not respond to traditional antipsychotics (quoting S.R. Marder et al., Schizophrenia, 16 
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 567-88 (1993)). 
115. Id. at 332 (noting that “the classic [antipsychotic] agents affect primarily the positive 
symptoms”). 
116. Id. (noting that the traditional antipsychotics “may worsen the negative symptomatolgy 
of schizophrenia”); Gary D. Tollefson & Todd M. Sanger, Negative Symptoms: A Path Analytic 
Approach to a Double-Blind, Placebo- and Haloperidol-Controlled Clinical Trial with Olanzap-
ine, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 466, 472 (1997) (noting that “neuroleptic drugs may actually worsen 
negative symptoms”). 
117. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 343 (“The therapeutic use of the phenothiazines invaria-
bly leads to many side effects.”).   
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they produce side effects similar to the symptoms of a neurological 
disease.”118  
Perhaps the side effect most objectionable to patients taking 
these drugs is a syndrome called akathisia, which is characterized 
by a “subjective feeling of anxiety, accompanied by restlessness, 
pacing, constant rocking back and forth, and other repetitive, pur-
poseless actions.”119 Other common motor disturbances include 
“tremors of the fingers, a shuffling gate, and drooling.”120 Antipsy-
chotics also, as was observed when they were first given to preop-
erative patients, produce such cognitive and emotional side effects 
as diminished consciousness and impaired motivation.121 Some evi-
dence suggests that these drugs also cause memory deficits.122 Dif-
ferent antipsychotics have different side effect profiles; for example, 
some tend to cause high levels of sedation but low levels of involun-
tary motor movements, while others cause low levels of sedation but 
high levels of involuntary motor movements.123 People taking these 
medications to treat the symptoms of schizophrenia often take addi-
tional medications to treat the side effects of the antipsychotics.124 
While helpful in preventing the side effects from becoming so both-
                                                                                                                       
118. DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 305. Although they can be severe, most side effects 
are temporary, enduring only so long as the drugs are administered. See JULIEN, supra note 101, 
at 342. One side effect, though, is usually permanent, persisting even after the drugs are discon-
tinued. Id. Tardive dyskinesia, which develops in ten to twenty percent of patients taking phe-
nothiazines and other traditional antipsychotics, is characterized by “involuntary hyperkinetic 
movements, often of the face and tongue but also of the trunk and limbs, which can be severely 
disabling.” Id. Another side effect, less common but potentially fatal, is neuroleptic malignant 
syndrome, which can involve respiratory or cardiac failure. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 
796. 
119. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 342; see also Simon M. Halstead, Thomas R.E. Barnes & Jer-
emy Speller, Akathisia: Prevalence and Associated Dysphoria in an In-patient Population with 
Chronic Schizophrenia, 164 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 177, 177 (1994) (“Akathisia can be particularly 
distressing and difficult to tolerate.”). 
120. DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 305. The American Psychological Association has 
identified six “Medication-Induced Movement Disorders” associated with the use of neuroleptics: 
“Neuroleptic-Induced Parkinsonism, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, Neuroleptic-Induced 
Acute Dystonia, Neuroleptic-Induced Acute Akathisia, Neuroleptic-Induced Tardive Dyskinesia, 
and Medication-Induced Postural Tremor.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 791. 
121. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
122. See Stacy A. Castner, Graham V. Williams & Patricia S. Goldman-Rakic, Reversal of 
Antipsychotic-Induced Working Memory Deficits by Short-Term Dopamine D1 Receptor Stimula-
tion, SCIENCE, Mar. 2000, at 2021 (indicating that “the present findings provide evidence that 
chronic haloperidol treatment can induce cognitive deficits”). 
123. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 340 (comparing side effects of different antipsychotic drugs). 
124. See id. at 343; see also United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 137 (D.D.C. 2001)  
(indicating that one way to “manage the side effects of antipsychotic medications” is “through 
supplementary medications”). 
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ersome that patients refuse to continue taking the antipsychotics,125 
these ancillary medications cause side effects of their own.126 
From a treatment perspective, the ideal antipsychotic drug 
would alter the neurotransmitter activity only of the particular 
brain cells that are functioning abnormally and are thereby causing 
symptoms of schizophrenia. Although drugs that alleviate the 
symptoms of schizophrenia without producing any side effects do 
not yet and perhaps may never exist, researchers are developing 
drugs that seem to be better than the phenothiazines and other 
traditional antipsychotics at targeting the specific neurons respon-
sible for producing the symptoms of schizophrenia. Since the 
Riggins decision in 1992, pharmaceutical companies have intro-
duced several new “atypical” antipsychotic drugs, which produce 
different neurotransmitter effects than the traditional antipsychot-
ics.127 While these newer drugs reduce dopamine activity, they do so 
more selectively than the phenothiazines, and they also reduce the 
activity of other neurotransmitters, especially serotonin.128 Perhaps 
because of this different effect on serotonin, atypical antipsychotics 
are more effective than traditional antipsychotics in alleviating 
negative symptoms of schizophrenia.129 Some patients have even 
described their response to these newer drugs as a “wakening.”130  
Because they reduce dopamine activity more selectively than 
do the phenothiazines, atypical antipsychotics are less likely to 
produce extrapyramidal side effects,131 at least when taken in mod-
                                                                                                                       
125. Cf. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 791 (noting that movement disorders induced by an-
tipsychotic medications “can lead to non-compliance with treatment”); Bruce J. Winick, The 
Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1, 70 (1989) (“Although these side effects are unintended, they are intrinsic to the drugs’ benevo-
lent properties and should not be trivialized, particularly since patients frequently experience 
them to be distressing enough to outweigh the drugs’ positive clinical effects.”). 
126.  See Stephen R. Marder, M.D., Schizophrenia: Somatic Treatment, in KAPLAN & 
SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1199, 1205 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia 
A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000) (noting that medications used to manage the extrapyramidal side 
effects of antipsychotics “cause their own adverse effects including dry mouth, constipation, 
blurred vision, and often memory loss”). 
127. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 335-36; see also United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 
877 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The atypicals, which the government has not ruled out, are newer and 
‘have a more favorable side effect profile.’ ” (quoting Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 124)). 
128. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 347 (describing the pharmacodynamics of clozapine). 
129. See Stephen M. Stahl, Selecting an Atypical Antipsychotic by Combining Clinical Ex-
perience with Guidelines from Clinical Trials, 60 (suppl. 10) J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 31, 31 
(1999) (noting as one property of atypical antipsychotics that they have “better efficacy for nega-
tive symptoms”). 
130. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 348. 
131. Id. at 335 (indicating that atypicals have a “reduce[d] . . . incidence of abnormal move-
ment-generating side effects”). 
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erate doses.132 Atypical antipsychotics are, however, likely to cause 
other substantial side effects. Because each drug produces a differ-
ent array of neurotransmitter effects, the side effects of atypical 
antipsychotics vary greatly.133 Some atypicals, for example, cause 
extreme sedation,134 while others are more likely to cause agitation 
and anxiety.135 Additionally, atypical antipsychotics are difficult to 
administer without a patient’s cooperation, because unlike the tra-
ditional antipsychotics, atypicals are not available in forms that can 
be injected.136 
B. How Administering Involuntary Psychotropic Drugs During Trial 
Violates the Defendant’s Fair Trial Rights 
1. Interference with the Exercise of Procedural Rights 
The purpose of a criminal trial is the fair determination of 
the guilt or innocence of a person accused of a crime.137 The impor-
tance of fairness is reflected in the provisions of the Constitution 
intended to ensure that someone charged with a crime is not con-
                                                                                                                       
132. See id. at 352; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 791-92 (“While newer antipsy-
chotic medications are less likely to cause Medication-Induced Movement Disorders, these syn-
dromes still occur.”). 
133. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 356; see also Christopher S. Thomas & Shon Lewis, Which 
Atypical Antipsychotic?, 172 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 106, 106 (1998) (“The atypical antipsychotics 
cause fewer extrapyramidal side-effects than older drugs, but the pattern with which they block 
other brain receptors varies considerably between drugs, which is reflected in different side-
effect profiles.”). 
134. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 349-50 (describing side effects of clozapine). 
135. See id. at 352 (describing side effects of risperidone). Although permanent side effects 
such as tardive dyskinesia are unlikely, several atypical antipsychotics do pose a risk of life-
threatening side effects, including neuroleptic malignant syndrome. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 
15, at 791-92 (noting that newer antipsychotics can cause the same motor disorders as the tradi-
tional antipsychotics). Other potentially fatal side effects include agranulocytosis (a blood disor-
der) and cardiac irregularities. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 347, 350. Furthermore, because atypi-
cal antipsychotics have been widely available for only slightly more than ten years, any conse-
quences of long-term administration remain to be discovered. See id. at 335 (indicating that the 
first atypical antipsychotic was made widely available in the early 1990s). 
136. See Joseph P. McEvoy, Patricia L. Scheifler & Allen Frances (eds.), The Expert Consen-
sus Guidelines Series: Treatment of Schizophrenia 1999, 60 (suppl. 11) J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 
8, 12 (1999) (noting that traditional antipsychotics are indicated for patients who require “IM 
[intramuscular] medication,” which is “not yet available for the atypicals”). 
137. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986) (“Without these basic [constitutional] 
protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of 
guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
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victed without an adequate opportunity to defend himself.138 The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the federal and state 
governments, respectively, from depriving a person “of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law.”139 The Fifth Amendment 
further prohibits the government from compelling a defendant to 
testify against himself.140 The Sixth Amendment grants several 
specific procedural rights, including the right to be tried by an im-
partial jury, to confront witnesses for the prosecution and also to 
summon witnesses for the defense, and to receive the assistance of 
counsel.141 Supreme Court decisions have added several other par-
ticular rights to the operational definition of a fair trial, including 
the right to be present during the trial,142 to have counsel appointed 
                                                                                                                       
138. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (“The fact that this right [to confront wit-
nesses] appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of 
those liberties and safeguards that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial 
in a criminal prosecution.”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (describing “the safe-
guards of the Sixth Amendment” as “deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of 
life and liberty”). 
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
140. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment has been ap-
plied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3  
(1964). 
141. The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Many of the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment have been 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406 
(applying right to confront prosecution witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 
(1963) (applying right to receive assistance of counsel). 
142. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934) (holding that “in a prosecution 
for a felony the defendant has the privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in 
his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of 
his opportunity to defend against the charge”). This presence refers to more than being physi-
cally present. Cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“The mentally incompetent defen-
dant, though physically in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend him-
self.”). 
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if necessary,143 to receive assistance of counsel that is effective,144 to 
present witnesses145 and other forms of evidence,146 and to testify.147 
Psychotropic drugs can interfere with a defendant’s ability to 
exercise these rights by causing sedation, producing feelings of rest-
lessness and anxiety, diminishing awareness of and interest in 
events happening in the surrounding environment, disrupting 
memory, and inducing all manner of motor disturbances.148 Admin-
istering involuntary psychotropic medications is likely to impair 
many abilities necessary for presenting a defense, including the 
ability to pay attention to what witnesses, or the attorneys, or any-
one else in the courtroom is saying; to offer comments or sugges-
tions or otherwise engage in a dialogue about the trial; to under-
stand and respond to questions while testifying; and even to decide 
whether to testify.149 By administering involuntary antipsychotic 
medications, the government interferes with the defendant’s gen-
eral right to be present, as well as with his more specific rights to 
receive effective assistance of counsel, to confront witnesses, to pre-
sent evidence, and to testify on his own behalf.150  
                                                                                                                       
143. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72 (1932) (holding that “the right to have counsel 
appointed, when necessary, is a logical corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by 
counsel”). 
144. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (noting that “the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel” (citations omitted)); cf. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (defining the standard for effective assistance of counsel). 
145. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1976) (finding right to present witnesses); 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (“Few rights are more fundamental than that 
of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.”). See generally Richard A. Nagareda, 
Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1999) (discussing the history 
and scope of the right to present witnesses). 
146. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 429 (1969) (“The right to present evidence is, of 
course, essential to the fair hearing required by the Due Process Clause.”). 
147. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (holding that the defendant has the right 
to testify and “present his own version of events in his owns words”); Washington, 388 U.S. at 19 
(referring to defendant’s right to present his own “version of the facts”); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 273 (1948) (finding “an opportunity to be heard in his defense” is one of the defendant’s 
rights that is “basic in our system of jurisprudence”). 
148. See supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text (discussing side effects of traditional an-
tipsychotics), notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing side effects of atypical antipsy-
chotics). 
149. Although the older antipsychotics pose the greatest risk of impairing the defendant’s 
ability to participate, this risk does exist with newer antipsychotic medications as well. See supra 
notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing side effects of atypical antipsychotics).  
150. The Ninth Circuit recently recognized the impact of involuntary psychotropic medica-
tion on the defendant’s ability to exercise constitutionally protected rights, holding that a defen-
dant was entitled to retroactive application of Riggins: 
We conclude that the rule announced in Riggins—that states must justify 
forced medication of the defendant during a criminal trial—is a rule of criminal 
procedure that implicates the kind of fundamental fairness contemplated in 
Teague. . . . Adherence to the Riggins rule is thus necessary for the meaningful 
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Some courts have suggested that involuntary psychotropic 
medications actually enhance rather than diminish a defendant’s 
ability to exercise procedural rights.151 Of course, a defendant whom 
involuntary psychotropic drugs have rendered competent to stand 
trial is at least slightly better able to exercise at least some of these 
rights, compared to when he was incompetent to stand trial.152 On 
the other hand, the argument that administering involuntary psy-
chotropic medications benefits the defense overlooks the unfairness 
of alleviating some symptoms of the defendant’s mental illness, 
thereby rendering him competent to stand trial, but at the same 
time exacerbating other symptoms, as well as causing a host of de-
bilitating side effects, thereby diminishing his ability to participate 
in the trial proceedings.153 
2. Prejudiced Demeanor and Diminished Credibility 
In addition to exercising the procedural rights necessary for 
presenting a defense, one of the defendant’s roles at trial is to influ-
ence jurors in a more passive way: by simply appearing before them 
                                                                                                                       
protection of a defendant’s right to counsel, right to confrontation, right to pre-
sent evidence, and right to a trial free from prejudice. Each of these constitu-
tional rights lies at the heart of the procedural protections designed to ensure a 
fair trial and uphold the integrity of the criminal justice system.  
Flowers v. Walters, 239 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001). The problem with the “Riggins rule” as 
formulated by the Ninth Circuit is that it assumes that states can justify administering involun-
tary medications to a defendant during trial, an assumption that arguably is unwarranted. See 
supra Part III; infra Part IV (discussing how involuntary medications during trial unjustifiably 
infringe a defendant’s right to a fair trial); see also Heffernan v. Norris, 48 F.3d 331, 336 (8th Cir. 
1995) (Bright, J., dissenting) (noting “the multiplicity of rights at stake in Riggins, each of which 
assumes a vital role in ensuring fundamentally fair and accurate trials”).   
Of course, a defendant, for a variety of reasons, may not exercise all of his trial rights (in-
deed, some trial rights are mutually exclusive; a defendant cannot both testify and remain si-
lent). The government should not, however, be allowed to deprive the defendant of the opportu-
nity to exercise any of these rights. This Note is not suggesting that the failure of a defendant to 
participate fully in the trial proceedings amounts to a violation of due process; only when the 
government has caused the defendant to be unable to participate fully is due process violated. 
See infra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing significance of the fact that administering 
involuntary medications to a defendant is a government action that precludes a defendant from 
fully participating in his own trial).  
151. E.g., United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 133 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Ironically, a 
strong likelihood exists that medication will enhance some of Weston’s trial rights, particularly 
his right to consult with counsel and to assist in his defense.”). 
152. See supra note 8 (discussing competency to stand trial); see also infra notes 230-31 and 
accompanying text (stressing that the requirements for competency to stand trial are minimal). 
153. See supra Part III.B (discussing ways that involuntary psychotropic medications inter-
fere with the ability to present a defense). 
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in the courtroom.154 A defendant who is taking antipsychotic drugs 
during trial can, because of the drug’s side effects and because of 
exacerbated negative symptoms, appear emotionally unresponsive, 
bored, nervous, or restless.155 None of these is likely to impress a 
jury favorably.156 The potential for prejudice is perhaps greatest 
when the medicated defendant testifies, because the jury may dis-
believe everything that the defendant says if he does not appear 
credible.157 
                                                                                                                       
154. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (“It is a fundamental assumption of the adversary system that the trier of fact observes 
the accused throughout the trial, while the accused is either on the stand or sitting at the de-
fense table.”). 
155. See supra Part III.A (discussing effects and side effects of antipsychotic drugs); see also 
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association for Petitioner at 13, Riggins v. Nevada, 
504 U.S. 127 (1992) (No. 90-8466) (“By administering medication, the State may be creating a 
prejudicial negative demeanor in the defendant—making him look nervous or restless, for exam-
ple, or so calm or sedated as to appear bored, cold, unfeeling and unresponsive. . . . That such 
effects may be subtle does not make them any less real or potentially influential.”), quoted in 
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, supra 
note 10, at 567 (noting that antipsychotic medications “often render people groggy and passive—
surely an inappropriate state in which to attend one’s own trial”).   
156. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“As any trial 
attorney will attest, serious prejudice could result if medication inhibits the defendant’s capacity 
to react and respond to the proceedings and to demonstrate remorse or compassion.”); United 
States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 494 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that “the jury may be misled by the 
demeanor of a defendant who appears not to care about the crime (or the victim) or who appears 
overly anxious at particular moments”); see also Capitol Hill Shooter (National Public Radio 
broadcast, May 16, 2001) (remarks of David Siegel, professor of law at Northeastern University) 
(“If a defendant’s given a medication that makes [him] seem sleepy, and then [he’s] listening to 
testimony about some terrible aspect of [his] case—people being shot, people dying, people in 
terrible pain—and [he doesn’t] seem to show any emotion, then the jury listening to that or 
watching that defendant can conclude this person is a cold, heartless killer.”); cf. FED. R. EVID. 
403 advisory committee’s notes (acknowledging that some evidence can “induc[e] decision on a 
purely emotional basis”); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (allowing disruptive defen-
dant to be removed from courtroom, and noting that “the sight of shackles and gags might have a 
significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the defendant”); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. 
Garvey & Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1600, 1617 (1998) (describing empirical research demonstrating that 
jurors’ beliefs about a defendant’s remorse can influence sentencing, and noting, “One thing a 
defendant should not do if he hopes to convince jurors of his remorse is look bored.”). 
157. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If the defen-
dant takes the stand, as Riggins did, his demeanor can have a great bearing on his credibility 
and persuasiveness, and on the degree to which he evokes sympathy.”); WINICK, supra note 8, at 
295 (“The side effects of medication may so alter the defendant’s demeanor that the trier of fact 
forms the impression that his testimony lacks credibility.”). Many courts routinely instruct jurors 
to consider demeanor when evaluating the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., 1A KEVIN F. 
O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG, & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS: CRIMINAL § 10.01, at 48 (5th ed. 2000) (specifying that the judge should instruct the jury 
that among the factors it may consider in deciding whether to believe a witness is the witness’s 
“manner of testifying”); see also Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 1963) (“It has long 
been a well-recognized and accepted principle that the appraisal of the value and weight of the 
testimony of a witness is to be based not only upon consideration of his spoken word but also 
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The seminal case recognizing that the government’s manipu-
lation of a defendant’s appearance can violate the defendant’s right 
to a fair trial is Estelle v. Williams.158 In Estelle, the Supreme Court 
held that the government impermissibly prejudices a defendant by 
compelling him to appear before the jury wearing a prison uni-
form.159 Compelling a defendant to appear in handcuffs or other 
visible physical restraints can similarly deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial.160 Admittedly, prison uniforms and physical restraints 
directly contradict the presumption of innocence161 in a way that 
psychotropic medications might not. With psychotropic medications, 
the challenge to the presumption of innocence may be less direct: 
medications can cause a defendant to appear apathetic and cold-
hearted, or nervous and lacking in credibility, thereby diminishing 
the jury’s ability to continue believing that the defendant is inno-
cent.162 Even though the threat posed by medication might be less 
direct, compelling a defendant to take psychotropic medications and 
compelling a defendant to appear in a prison uniform or visible re-
straints are alike in one respect: in both situations, the government 
is manipulating the jury’s impression of the defendant in a way 
that certainly will impact, and may well determine, the jury’s ver-
dict.163 
                                                                                                                       
upon observation of his manner of testifying, his demeanor on the witness stand, his gestures, 
his inflections, his frankness or evasiveness, his intelligence and the reasonableness of his 
statements.”). Textbooks on witness preparation stress that demeanor is an important tool that 
jurors use to assess credibility: “Evaluations of credibility are heavily influenced by perceptions 
of trustworthiness. . . . Nonverbal communication and behavior are the primary sources of posi-
tive evaluations [of a witness’s trustworthiness]. Mannerisms, tone of voice, facial expressions, 
touch, smiles; jurors evaluate all of these.” V. HALE STARR, WITNESS PREPARATION § 7.1.3 (2000). 
158. 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976). 
159. Id. (holding that “the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, com-
pel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes”). 
160. See Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, a criminal defen-
dant has a constitutional right to appear before a jury free of shackles.” (citing Wilson v. 
McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1985))); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL 
& NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.2(e), at 466 (2d ed. 1999) (noting a general “right to 
appear before the jury free from shackles or other physical restraints”). 
161. See Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504-05 (“Courts have . . . determined that an accused should not 
be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the 
presumption [of innocence] so basic to the adversary system.”); see also 2 LAFAVE, ISRAEL & 
KING, supra note 160, § 24.2(e), at 465 (“Because this presumption [of innocence] is likely to be 
impaired if the defendant is required to stand trial in prison or jail clothing, the courts have 
rather consistently held that such a procedure is improper.”). 
162. See supra Part III.B (discussing ways that psychotropic drugs interfere with the ability 
to present a defense).   
163. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (“At all stages of the proceedings, the defendant’s behavior, manner, facial expressions, 
and emotional responses, or their absence, combine to make an overall impression on the trier of 
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3. Altered Evidence of Mental State 
Those who are insane164 have long been excused from legal 
responsibility for behaviors that would otherwise constitute crimi-
nal offenses.165 Presently, federal law recognizes insanity as an af-
firmative defense,166 as do the criminal codes of most states.167 Some 
                                                                                                                       
fact, an impression that can have a powerful influence on the outcome of the trial.”); see also 
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association for Petitioner at 13, Riggins v. Nevada, 
504 U.S. 127 (1992) (No. 90-8466) (arguing that involuntary medication “may tilt the balance of 
the adversary system against the accused”); supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (indicat-
ing that the jury can be misled by the defendant’s drug-affected demeanor). The Supreme Court 
of New Jersey recently held that a defendant was entitled to a new trial after “testifying before 
the jury in a visibly disheveled state,” which had resulted from being “denied [while in jail await-
ing trial] the basic necessities such as food, soap, water, a clean mattress and blanket, and a 
comb.” State v. Maisonet, 763 A.2d 1254, 1256 (N.J. 2001). The court concluded, “That defen-
dant’s overall appearance, caused by factors beyond his control, may have unduly impugned his 
credibility in the eyes of jurors is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1260. 
Some courts have cited an additional reason for prohibiting the handcuffing or shackling of a 
defendant, which applies equally to administering involuntary medications: “[T]he fact that a 
prisoner appears in shackles may, to some extent, deprive him of the free and calm use of all his 
faculties. The result would be a denial of the fair trial guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution . . . .” State v. Roberts, 206 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1965) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
164. “Insane” is not a term of art in psychiatry or psychology. Instead, the term “insane” is 
defined by statutes that allow insanity as a defense. Thus, “insane” means whatever a given 
legislature decides that it means. See DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 536 (“Insanity is a 
legal concept, not a psychiatric or psychological concept.”). The traditional definition of insanity 
comes from the 1843 English case of M’Naghten. Under M’Naghten, insanity means that “at the 
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was lab[o]ring under such a defect of reason, 
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he 
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 
718, 722 (1843). Since M’Naghten, various other tests of insanity have been proposed, including 
the irresistible impulse test, the Durham test, and the ALI Model Penal Code test. See RICHARD 
J. BONNIE, JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR. & PETER W. LOW, A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE: 
THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 14-20 (2d ed. 2000). Research suggests, however, that 
juries’ decisions are not much influenced by the particular test they are instructed to apply. See 
STANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 955-56 (6th ed. 1995) (describing research demonstrating that “[t]here is little 
evidence that different formulations of the insanity defense produce different results in prac-
tice”). 
165. See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 777, 781 n.5 (1985) (“The modern insanity defense dates at least from Hadfield’s 
case.” (citing Rex v. Hadfield, 27 State Trials 1281 (1800))); BONNIE, JEFFRIES & LOW, supra note 
164, at 7 (“From the earliest times, the courts and legislatures have provided for ‘tests’ of crimi-
nal responsibility that, if satisfied, would result in an acquittal of crime.”). 
166. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).  
167. See Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in 
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1200 n.2 (2000) (noting that “[f]ive states have abolished 
the [insanity] defense” (citing IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 
(1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-214 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.035 (Michie 1997); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1999))); see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952) 
(upholding the constitutionality of not recognizing insanity as a defense). 
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states also recognize other defenses, such as partial responsibility, 
that reduce culpability based on a defendant’s abnormal mental 
state at the time the offense was committed.168 Additionally, a de-
fendant’s mental state at the time of the offense is almost always 
relevant in a criminal trial, given the prosecution’s usual burden of 
proving that the defendant had the requisite mens rea to be con-
victed of the charged offense.169 
Legal scholars have offered various ethical and moral bases 
for the insanity defense.170 Juries, however, along with the rest of 
                                                                                                                       
168. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 960 P.2d 877, 884 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that “a de-
fense of ‘partial responsibility’ is available when ‘knowing’ conduct is charged” (interpreting OR. 
REV. STAT. § 161.300 (1990))). See generally Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Law: Undiminished 
Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 20 (1984) (“Partial respon-
sibility is a form of lesser legal insanity: The defendant is claiming that, as a result of mental 
abnormality, he is not fully responsible for the crime proven against him.”). 
169. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Our rule permits 
the introduction of expert testimony as to abnormal condition if it is relevant to negative, or 
establish, the specific mental condition that is an element of the crime.”); see also Slobogin, supra 
note 167, at 1200 n.2 (noting that all states that have abolished the insanity defense have “main-
tain[ed] the mens rea alternative”). This “mens rea alternative” resembles one variant of what 
has been called the “diminished capacity” defense. See Morse, supra note 168, at 1 (indicating 
that the “mens rea variant” of diminished capacity “allows a criminal defendant to introduce 
evidence of mental abnormality at trial . . . to negate a mental element of the crime charged, 
thereby exonerating the defendant of that charge”). The defendant’s mental state is of course not 
relevant when the defendant is charged with a strict liability offense. Additionally, states can 
impose limitations on the kinds of evidence a defendant can present regarding his mental state 
at the time of the offense. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (holding that a 
Montana statute, which prohibited a defendant from introducing evidence of voluntary intoxica-
tion to negate the mens rea of a charged offense, did not violate due process). 
170. For example, Stephen J. Morse writes: 
The basic moral issue regarding the insanity defense is whether it is just to 
hold responsible and punish a person who was extremely crazy at the time of 
the offense. Those who believe that the insanity defense should be abolished 
must claim either that no defendant is extremely crazy at the time of the of-
fense or that it is morally proper to convict and punish such people. Neither 
claim is easy to justify. 
Morse, supra note 165, at 780; see also Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 437 (1914) (“The sine qua 
non of all crimes and misdemeanors at law is a criminal intent. . . . Insane persons are incapable 
of entertaining a criminal intent, and therefore incapable of committing a crime.” (citing trea-
tises HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN; HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN; BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL 
LAW)); ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 13-14 (1967) (“[T]he insanity defense de-
scribes the man who is sufficiently different from the rest of us that he cannot be used as an 
effective example and who, in quite personal terms, cannot be expected to approach events mind-
ful of the warnings sent to him by the criminal code.”), quoted in RALPH REISNER, CHRISTOPHER 
SLOBOGIN & ARTI RAI, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 517 
(3d ed. 1999). For an in-depth discussion, see Michael S. Moore, Legal Conceptions of Mental 
Illness, in MENTAL ILLNESS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 25 (Baruch A. Brody & H. Tristram Engel-
hardt, Jr. eds., 1980).  
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the general public, tend to dislike the insanity defense.171 One rea-
son for the dislike of the insanity defense is the perception that it 
allows many defendants to “get away with” their crimes.172 Because 
mental states must be inferred from the words and actions of a de-
fendant rather than observed directly or measured objectively, the 
possibility exists that a defendant is malingering,173 or trying to 
deceive the jury into believing that he was insane at the time of the 
offense.174 Attitudes towards the insanity defense are not helped 
when expert witnesses, such as psychiatrists, are perceived as will-
ing to say whatever it is that they are hired to say.175 In recent 
years, especially following the verdict in the John Hinckley case,176 
legislatures have made the criteria for successfully presenting an 
                                                                                                                       
171. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 198 (1986) (noting “a great 
deal of negative feeling toward the insanity defense,” including “public negativism” and “juries 
that are, on the whole, suspicious of the insanity plea”). 
172. See id. at 186 (describing research findings that “people drastically overestimate the use 
and success of the insanity plea” and mistakenly believe that “the insanity defense allows dan-
gerous people to go free”); see also NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, supra note 10, at 682 (“The lay public 
often thinks of the insanity defense as a means by which guilty people ‘get off.’ “). 
173. The DSM defines malingering as “the intentional production of false or grossly exagger-
ated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as avoiding 
military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or 
obtaining drugs.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 739. 
174. See United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting) 
(“Public opposition to any insanity-grounded offense is often based, either explicitly or implicitly, 
on the view that the plea is frequently invoked by violent criminals who use it to fraudulently 
evade just punishment.”); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 171, at 195 (discussing results of a study 
indicating that some jurors are “distrustful of schizophrenic defendants and concerned that they 
might be making up their mental problems literally to get away with murder” but are less dis-
trustful of “defendants suffering from organic problems [who] could not have generated them 
merely as an excuse”). Concerns about fraud are, of course, not unique to the insanity defense, 
but exist in most trials. 
175. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Per-
ceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (1997) (describing research finding 
that “[j]urors commonly believed that experts would skew their testimony for ‘whomever is pay-
ing for their testimony’ ”); see also Daniel Slater & Valerie P. Hans, Public Opinion of Forensic 
Psychiatry Following the Hinckley Verdict, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 675, 676 (1984) (reporting 
that after the Hinckley verdict, more than sixty percent of the public had either “no confidence” 
or only “slight confidence” in expert psychiatric testimony); George F. Will, Insanity and Success, 
WASH. POST, June 23, 1982, at A27 (“Psychiatry as practiced by some of today’s itinerant ex-
perts-for-hire is this century’s alchemy. No, that is unfair to alchemists, who were confused but 
honest. Some of today’s rent-a-psychiatry is charlatanism laced with cynicism.”), quoted in 
BONNIE, JEFFRIES & LOW, supra note 164, at 132.   
176. See Peter Perl, Public that Saw Reagan Shot Expresses Shock at the Verdict, WASH. 
POST, June 23, 1982, at A8 (discussing reaction to jury’s finding that John Hinckley was not 
guilty by reason of insanity of charges related to the shooting of President Reagan and others); 
see also United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1348, 1350-51 (D.D.C. 1981), aff’d, 672 
F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that the prosecution’s use of evidence obtained from a court-
ordered psychiatric examination did not violate the defendant’s privilege against self-
incrimination). 
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insanity defense more difficult; for example, most jurisdictions now 
require that the defendant prove insanity by clear and convincing 
evidence.177 Thus, a defendant who claims that he is not guilty by 
reason of insanity faces an uphill battle.178 
The “battle” is made even more difficult by the administra-
tion of psychotropic medications, which alleviate the symptoms—or 
evidence179—of insanity. Medications alter the evidence of insanity 
in two ways. First, medications affect the way that a defendant, if 
he chooses to testify, describes his mental state at the time of the 
offense. Antipsychotic drugs alleviate those symptoms of a mental 
illness, such as delusions and hallucinations, that would be most 
                                                                                                                       
177. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 164, at 953 (“Responses to the Hinckley verdict 
. . . included adjustments in the burden of proof, changes in the disposition of insanity acquittees, 
introduction of a separate verdict of ‘guilty but mentally ill’ and complete abolition of the insan-
ity defense.”); see also Morse, supra note 165, at 779 (“The shock generated by the verdict in the 
Hinckley case has revived recurrent criticism and efforts to abolish or reform the insanity de-
fense.” (citations omitted)). 
178. See Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals 
in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 477 (1980) (not-
ing that “the factfinder is likely to view with considerable skepticism the defendant’s claim that 
he did not function as would a normal person under the circumstances”); Sundby, supra note 
175, at 1139 (describing research demonstrating that “[i]n sum, experts’ explanations of human 
behavior that run contrary to notions of free will are hard to sell to the jury”). Not all incompe-
tent detainees, if they become competent to stand trial, will want to argue an insanity defense, 
given that acquittal by reason of insanity can mean an indeterminate commitment to a psychiat-
ric treatment facility. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983) (“There simply is no 
necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for recovery. 
The length of the acquittee’s hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the pur-
poses of his commitment.”). Additionally, insanity defenses rarely succeed. See DAVISON & 
NEALE, supra note 10, at 531 (“A staggering amount has been written on the insanity defense, 
even though it is pleaded in less than 1 percent of all cases that reach trial and is rarely success-
ful.”); KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 164, at 955 (“Nationally, insanity acquittals probably 
represent no more than 0.25 percent of terminated felony prosecutions.” (citation omitted)). On 
the other hand, defendants who were so seriously mentally ill as to be incompetent to stand trial 
may well want to present a partial responsibility or a diminished capacity defense, see supra 
notes 168-69, which may be easier for the defendant to establish than insanity and may not 
subject the defendant to indefinite civil commitment. These variations of the insanity defense, 
like the insanity defense itself, are especially important in cases, such as that of Russell Weston 
or Andrea Yates, in which the defendant cannot plausibly deny committing the actus reus of the 
charged offense. See An Insane System, WASH. POST, July 30, 2001, at A14 (“The key facts here 
are not debatable. There is little doubt that Mr. Weston committed the horrifying crimes with 
which he is charged. Yet the notion of legal insanity has no meaning if it does not describe 
him.”); Texas Mother’s Murder Trial Set for Jan. 7, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2001, at A2 (“Yates’[s] 
lawyers allege that she was suffering from a psychotic form of postpartum depression on June 20 
when she drowned her children.”). 
179. Cf. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (“When the State commands medication during the pretrial and trial phases of the case for 
the avowed purpose of changing the defendant’s behavior, the concerns are much the same as if 
it were alleged that the prosecution had manipulated material evidence.” (citing Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963))). 
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likely to convince a jury that the defendant was insane at the time 
of the offense.180 At trial, a defendant who is taking psychotropic 
drugs, and is therefore no longer hallucinating or delusional, may 
be able to describe these symptoms (if at all) only in a calm, de-
tached, or dreamlike manner.181 The defendant’s inability to convey 
the phenomenological experience of his psychotic symptoms may 
cause the jury to conclude that, at the time of the offense, the de-
fendant was not suffering from any kind of mental abnormality, or 
at least not from a mental abnormality serious enough to cause in-
sanity.182 Second, medications can alter the defendant’s demeanor 
during the trial: a defendant taking a traditional antipsychotic 
medication is unlikely to appear insane, and a defendant taking a 
newer antipsychotic may appear completely well.183 This appear-
ance of sanity at the time of the trial will make all the more unbe-
lievable to a jury the defendant’s claim that a serious mental illness 
                                                                                                                       
180. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (indicating that antipsychotics are most 
effective in alleviating positive symptoms). 
181. See United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 133 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that Wes-
ton’s psychiatrist “testified that antipsychotic medication might cause Weston to filter out events 
that might be too disturbing for him to cope with or to recount events as one would recount a 
dream” (citation to transcript omitted)); see also supra text accompanying note 105 (indicating 
that antipsychotic medications can cause sedation and apathy). 
182. Judge Tatel’s concurring opinion in Weston describes this problem in compelling detail: 
Rendering Weston nondelusional may impair his ability to mount an effective 
insanity defense. . . . A jury listening to a non-delusional Weston explain, per-
haps quite passively, that at the time of the crime he believed he had to save 
the world from the Ruby Satellite System will be considerably more skeptical 
than a jury that sees and hears the person Dr. Johnson saw and heard: Russell 
Weston, delusional and unmedicated, explaining in the present tense that there 
is a “Ruby Satellite System” and that he in fact went to the Capitol in search of 
the override console to save the country from “human corpses rotting, turning 
black, and spreading the most deadliest disease known to mankind.”   
United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring); cf. Benjamin B. 
Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental 
Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1415 (1986) (“Irrationality is a vital aspect of the exculpa-
tory nature of insanity because rationality is an essential attribute of intelligible conduct, of 
behavior an observer, such as a jury, can interpret.”). 
183. See supra notes 114, 129-30 and accompanying text (noting that traditional antipsychot-
ics alleviate the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, while atypicals can alleviate positive and 
negative symptoms). This is the mirror image of the problem that occurs with credibility, creat-
ing a Catch-22 situation: psychotropic medications will either produce side effects, causing the 
jury to believe that the defendant is cold-hearted or is lying, or will not produce side effects, 
causing the jury to believe that the defendant was not suffering from a mental defect at the time 
of the crime. Either way, the defendant that the jury sees, and perhaps convicts, is a creation of 
the government’s decision to administer involuntary psychotropic drugs. See JOSEPH HELLER, 
CATCH-22 54 (1955) (“Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as 
soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. . . . If he flew 
them he was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had to.”). 
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caused him to be unable to distinguish right from wrong, or to re-
sist doing what he knew was wrong.184 
Evidence of the defendant’s mental state at the time of the 
offense is especially important when the defendant is asserting a 
defense of insanity, because the defendant is in effect admitting to 
the actus reus of the crime and denying only the mens rea ele-
ment.185 Thus, the only issue in contention at trial is the mental 
state of the defendant at the time of the offense, an issue the jury 
cannot help but decide based on its observations of the defendant 
during the trial.186 
The practice of instructing the jury to consider the defen-
dant’s manner of testifying when evaluating an insanity defense 
further suggests that altering the way the defendant describes his 
mental state at the time of the offense will influence the jury’s as-
sessment of the defendant’s guilt.187 Also, the ability of a defendant 
                                                                                                                       
184. See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983) (“If the defendant 
appears calm and controlled at trial, the jury may well discount any testimony that the defen-
dant lacked, at the time of the crime, substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of the law.”); DAVISON & NEALE, 
supra note 10, at 539 (“If the defendant appears normal, the jury may be less likely to believe 
that the crime was an act of a disturbed mental state rather than of free will . . . .”); John Conley, 
William O’Barr & E. Allen Lind, The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 
1978 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1399 (concluding that a witness’s “testimonial style exerts a strong influ-
ence on the jury’s perception of the substance of testimony”). 
185. Many courts treat a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and a plea of guilty simi-
larly, requiring a judge, before accepting the plea, to determine that the defendant is making the 
plea knowingly and voluntarily. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Shegrud, 389 N.W.2d 7, 12-15 (Wis. 1986) 
(finding defendant’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was made freely, knowingly and 
voluntarily); see also Justine A. Dunlap, What’s Competence Got to Do with It: The Right Not to 
Be Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 495, 515- 517 (1997) (describing similar 
cases).   
186. See DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 539 (“[J]uries form their judgments of legal re-
sponsibility or insanity at least in part on how the defendant appears during the trial.”); see also 
Lawrence v. State, 454 S.E.2d 446, 451 (Ga. 1995) (“We find merit in the argument that a State’s 
compliance with the requirements in Riggins fails to address adequately an accused’s interest in 
the impact his medicated demeanor may have upon the jury’s evaluation of his sanity.”); 
Louraine, 453 N.E.2d at 442 (“In a case where an insanity defense is raised, the jury are likely to 
assess the weight of the various pieces of evidence before them with reference to the defendant’s 
demeanor.”). 
187. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association for Petitioner at 12, 
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (No. 90-8466) (noting that “the trial court instructed the 
jury to consider Riggins’[s] ‘manner upon the stand’ when assessing the credibility of his insanity 
defense”). Courts commonly instruct juries to consider a witness’s “manner on the stand” when 
assessing credibility. See supra note 157; see also State v. Johnson, 751 A.2d 298, 362 (Conn. 
2000) (“Courts have held that, when the defendant has placed his mental state or character in 
issue, the jury properly may be asked to consider the defendant’s courtroom demeanor.” (cita-
tions omitted)). In addition to instructions from the court, the prosecutor may urge the jury to 
consider the defendant’s courtroom demeanor as evidence against a claim of insanity.  See Com-
monwealth v. Hunter, 695 N.E.2d 653, 657 (Mass. 1998) (“Where the defendant’s sanity is at 
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who is taking psychotropic medications to inform the jury about the 
effects of these medications implies a recognition that the jury may 
draw erroneous conclusions about the defendant’s guilt based on 
the defendant’s drug-affected presentation at trial.188 Other meth-
ods by which a defendant might be allowed to provide information 
to the jury about the effects and side effects of psychotropic drugs 
administered during trial, methods such as discontinuing the drugs 
briefly so that the defendant can testify in an unmedicated state, 
similarly acknowledge that psychotropic medications can affect the 
defendant’s functioning in ways that will influence the jury’s ver-
dict.189 
                                                                                                                       
issue, the prosecution may alert jurors to inconsistencies between the defendant’s conduct at 
trial and his alleged mental illness.” (citing Commonwealth v. Smiledge, 643 N.E.2d 41 (Mass. 
1994))). 
188. See Commonwealth v. Gurney, 595 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Mass. 1992) (holding that defen-
dant had the right to inform the jury that he was taking antidepressants during the trial because 
this fact “should have been considered by the jury when assessing [the defendant’s] character 
and credibility, as well as deciding whether he possessed the specific intent to commit the crimes 
charged”). At least one state, Florida, has enacted a statute mandating that the judge, at the 
request of the defendant, inform the jury that the defendant is taking psychotropic medications, 
when the medications are necessary to maintain the defendant’s competency to stand trial. FLA. 
R. CRIM. P. 3.215(c)(2) (“If the defendant proceeds to trial with the aid of medication for a mental 
or emotional condition, on the motion of defense counsel, the jury shall, at the beginning of the 
trial and in the charge to the jury, be given explanatory instructions regarding such medica-
tion.”); see also Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 158 (Fla. 1998) (holding that instructions are 
required “only when the defendant’s ability to proceed to trial is because of such [psychotropic] 
medication”). The inability of such instructions to protect trial rights adequately is discussed 
infra Part IV.A. 
189. See State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 974-75 (Conn. 1995) (“The accused in a criminal trial 
has the right to present himself to the jury—in speech, appearance and personality—as he really 
is at the time of trial, and probably was at the time he allegedly committed the crime. In other 
words, he has the right to be himself without modification of his personality through the forced 
administration of antipsychotic drugs.”); State v. Posby, 574 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1997) (reversing conviction and remanding for new trial when the trial court refused to allow the 
defendant to discontinue psychotropic medication three days before he was scheduled to testify, 
“so that the jury could observe defendant in the manner he was at the time of the shooting (that 
is, not on any medication)”), vacated due to death of defendant, 583 N.W.2d 458 (Mich. 1998); see 
also Commonwealth v. Gaboriault, No. CR 9673CR290A-B, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 127, at *75 
(Mass. Super. Apr. 4, 2001) (citations omitted): 
A defendant is entitled to place before the jury any evidence which is at all pro-
bative of his mental condition. Thus, where a defendant argues that he lacked 
criminal intent due to a mental illness, the State and Federal Constitutions 
may require that the defendant be afforded an opportunity to have a jury ob-
serve him in an unmedicated state. 
Problems with discontinuing psychotropic medications to allow the jury to observe the defendant  
while he is in an unmedicated state are discussed infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text. 
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IV. CONSIDERING POTENTIAL COUNTERARGUMENTS 
A. Prejudicial Effects Cannot Be Cured by Jury Instructions or 
Additional Evidence 
A trial must be fair, but it need not be perfect.190 Generally, 
trial defects, even those undeniably prejudicial to the defense, can 
be cured by measures such as instructions to the jury or the admis-
sion of additional evidence, including the testimony of expert and 
lay witnesses.191 Some defects, though, create prejudice that so un-
dermines the fairness of the trial that curative measures are insuf-
ficient.192 A key question, then, is whether jury instructions, wit-
ness testimony, or any other additional measures can cure the 
prejudicial effects of administering involuntary psychotropic drugs 
to a defendant during trial. So long as a substantial threat exists 
that these drugs will violate the defendant’s constitutional right to 
a fair trial (which arguably is always193), courts should not allow a 
                                                                                                                       
190. See United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” (quoting 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986))). 
191. In Weston, for example, the district court proposed a variety of methods for explaining to 
the jury the effects and side effects of involuntary medications, methods that the court suggested 
would protect Weston’s right to a fair trial: 
If Weston is medicated and his competency is restored, the Court is willing to 
take whatever reasonable measures are necessary to ensure that his rights are 
protected. This may include informing the jurors that Weston is being adminis-
tered mind-altering medication, that his behavior in their presence is condi-
tioned on drugs being administered to him at the request of the government, 
and allowing experts and others to testify regarding Weston’s unmedicated con-
dition, the effects of the medication on Weston, and the necessity of medication 
to render Weston competent to stand trial.  
United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 137 (D.D.C. 2001). The court’s willingness to allow 
jury instructions, expert testimony, lay testimony, and whatever other measures the court might 
find reasonable, belies the conclusion that any of these (or any other) methods will truly guard 
against an unfair conviction. See infra Part IV (discussing inadequacy of such measures). 
192. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968). In Bruton, the Court found 
the judge’s “concededly clear” instructions to the jury to ignore the inadmissible hearsay state-
ments of one codefendant when determining the guilt of another codefendant inadequate to “sub-
stitute for petitioner’s constitutional right of cross-examination.” Id. at 137; see also Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965) (“It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process 
deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times 
a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is 
deemed inherently lacking in due process.”). 
193. See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text (proposing that a court cannot determine 
that a defendant’s rights will not be violated by involuntary medications). 
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defendant who is being administered involuntary psychotropic 
drugs to be brought to trial.194 
Administering involuntary antipsychotic drugs violates the 
right to a fair trial in three ways: by diminishing the defendant’s 
ability to exercise procedural rights, by prejudicing the defendant’s 
demeanor, and by altering evidence of the defendant’s mental state 
at the time of the offense.195 Diminishing the defendant’s ability to 
exercise procedural rights is incurable both in theory and in prac-
tice.196 While prejudicing the defendant’s demeanor and altering 
evidence of the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense 
are perhaps curable in theory, are not curable in practice.197 
1. Interference with the Exercise of Procedural Rights 
The prejudice caused by diminishing the defendant’s ability 
to exercise procedural rights is completely unamenable to cure, be-
cause neither the instructions of a judge, the testimony of defense 
witnesses, nor the introduction of any other kind of evidence can 
demonstrate to the jury how the defendant would have interacted 
differently with his attorney, responded differently to prosecution 
witnesses, or testified differently had he not been medicated.198 
                                                                                                                       
194. Cf. Estes, 381 U.S. at 564 (“[T]he criminal trial under our Constitution has a clearly de-
fined purpose, to provide a fair and reliable determination of guilt, and no procedure or occur-
rence which seriously threatens to divert it from that purpose can be tolerated.”); Riggins v. 
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 141 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that unless 
the government can “make a showing that there is no significant risk that the medication will 
impair or alter in any material way the defendant’s capacity or willingness to react to the testi-
mony at trial or to assist his counsel,” the defendant may not be administered involuntary medi-
cations); Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137 (“[T]he introduction of [codefendant] Evans’[s] confession posed 
a substantial threat to petitioner’s right to confront the witnesses against him, and this is a 
hazard we cannot ignore.”); Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149, 1169 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added) (noting “the long-standing principle . . . that jurors 
are presumed to follow admonitory instructions given by the court unless the information they 
are ordered to disregard posed a ‘substantial threat’ to a defendant’s Constitutional rights” (quot-
ing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137)). 
195. See supra Part III.B. 
196. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
197. See infra Part IV.A.2-3. 
198. Justice Thomas’s dissent in Riggins was based in part on this problem of determining 
which of the defendant’s behaviors to attribute to the defendant himself and which to attribute to 
the medication: “[Riggins] has not stated how he would have directed his counsel to examine or 
cross-examine witnesses differently. He has not identified any testimony or instructions that he 
did not understand.” Riggins, 504 U.S. at 149-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The difficulty of point-
ing to discrete instances of prejudice, however, is part of the reason that the majority decided 
that Riggins was entitled to a new trial. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137; see also Yohn v. Love, 887 
F. Supp. 773, 786 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that some “errors may require automatic invalida-
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Furthermore, even if such demonstrations were possible, they 
would not compensate for the defendant’s lost opportunity actually 
to interact with his attorney, respond to witnesses, or testify in his 
own words.199 
2. Prejudiced Demeanor and Diminished Credibility 
The effect of involuntary psychotropic drugs on a defendant’s 
demeanor, because it involves the presentation of a kind of evidence 
rather than the exercise of procedural rights, is at least in theory 
more amenable to cure.200 In reality, though, the prejudice caused 
by the defendant’s drug-altered demeanor cannot be separated from 
everything else that happens at trial.201 Arguably, the most curable 
kind of prejudice results from a discrete event, such as an improper 
act by the prosecutor or an inadmissible statement by a witness. 
When prejudice is caused by a particular event, a judge can usually 
instruct the jury to disregard that event.202 Similarly, the judge can 
instruct the jury about how to consider particular, identifiable 
items of evidence—with reference to one codefendant but not to an-
other, for example.203 Meaningfully instructing a jury regarding in-
                                                                                                                       
tion of a conviction . . . because prejudice is so likely to occur but so difficult to prove” (citing 
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127)). 
199. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137-38 (“We also are persuaded that allowing Riggins to pre-
sent expert testimony about the effect of Mellaril on his demeanor did nothing to cure the possi-
bility that the substance of his own testimony, his interaction with counsel, or his comprehension 
at trial were compromised by forced administration of Mellaril.”); see also Bruton, 391 U.S. at 
135-37 (holding that jury instructions could not compensate for the inability to cross-examine 
prosecution witness). 
200. Many courts have suggested that the prejudicial effects on the defendant’s demeanor 
can be cured. See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Henderson, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he testimony of both lay and expert witnesses, whether on direct or cross, will 
suffice to address any differences in Weston’s appearance.”); People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 
797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (“[W]e believe that informing the jury of [defendant’s] drugged condi-
tion adequately protected his right to testify.”); Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 538 (Nev. 1991) 
(“In this case, there was ample expert testimony regarding the effect that the Mellaril had on 
Riggins. . . . [W]e are persuaded that expert testimony was sufficient to inform the jury of the 
effect of the Mellaril on Riggins’[s] demeanor and testimony.”), rev’d, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
201. Cf. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The side effects 
of antipsychotic drugs may alter demeanor in a way that will prejudice all facets of the de-
fense.”). 
202. See infra note 211 (arguing that prejudice from discrete factors is more curable than 
prejudice from continuous factors). In some instances, of course, instructions will be insufficient 
to cure prejudice caused even by a discrete factor. See Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 
(9th Cir. 1997) (“There are some extreme situations in which curative instructions will not neu-
tralize the prejudice when evidence is improperly admitted.”). 
203. FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one pur-
pose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon 
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voluntary psychotropic drugs would require the judge to tell the 
jury to disregard, or to consider in some limited way, not an event 
but an effect; or rather, myriad effects, which the judge would likely 
have considerable difficulty specifying.204 Even if a judge were to 
attempt such complex instructions, the complexity of the instruc-
tions would likely limit the ability of jurors to follow them.205 On 
the other hand, simply informing the jury that the defendant is be-
ing administered psychotropic drugs seems unlikely to be very 
curative: instructions that do not explain how these drugs are af-
fecting the defendant and how the jury should consider this infor-
mation seem unlikely to avert the jury from basing its assessment 
of the defendant’s character, credibility, or guilt on its observations 
of the defendant’s drug-induced appearance, testimony, and behav-
ior in the courtroom. A problem with explicit instructions, however, 
is that if the defendant is allowed to introduce evidence about the 
effects and side effects of psychotropic medications, then instruc-
tions by the court concerning these medications might be consid-
ered an invasion of the jury’s fact-finding province.206  
Allowing the defendant to present additional evidence about 
the effects of involuntary psychotropic drugs is no more likely to 
cure the prejudice caused by these drugs than are instructions from 
the court. For example, testimony could be provided by an expert 
witness such as a psychiatrist, who could inform the jury that in his 
opinion, involuntary psychotropic drugs are causing the defendant 
to experience certain side effects. Of course, the prosecutor would 
undoubtedly have his own expert psychiatrist, who would inform 
the jury that in his opinion, the drugs are not causing the defen-
                                                                                                                       
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”). Evi-
dence against one codefendant that is prejudicial to a second codefendant, however, may be 
grounds for severance of the defendants. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 (“If it appears that a defendant or 
the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or infor-
mation or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of 
counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.”). 
204. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “the 
inquiry itself is elusive, for it assumes some baseline of normality that experts may have some 
difficulty in establishing for a particular defendant, if they can establish it at all”); DSM-IV-TR, 
supra note 15, at 301 (describing difficulties that clinicians experience in distinguishing antipsy-
chotic side effects from negative symptoms); see also supra note 198 (discussing difficulty of 
identifying precise effects of psychotropic drugs). 
205. Cf. Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework 
Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 164-66 (1989) (summarizing empirical research 
demonstrating the ineffectiveness of complex jury instructions about eyewitness identification 
testimony). 
206. See People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 177 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (“The giving of this instruction 
[regarding involuntary medication] would have been improper because it would have directed the 
jury to accept, as fact, part of a witness’[s] testimony.”). 
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dant to experience those side effects. Such a duel of the experts 
would likely leave the jury confused at best.207 Furthermore, even if 
a jury did accept completely a defense expert’s assessment that the 
defendant’s demeanor at trial reflected drug-induced side effects 
rather than character or personality traits,208 and thus the jury did 
not count the defendant’s apparent apathy or anxiety against him, 
the jury would still have no positive or affirmative demeanor evi-
dence to count in the defendant’s favor.209 Unlike most incidents at 
trial that prejudice the defense, allowing the government to present 
its evidence—the defendant in a drug-altered state—denies the de-
                                                                                                                       
207. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing widespread skepticism regarding 
psychiatrists testifying as expert witnesses). While this confusion exists to some extent in every 
case involving expert witnesses, the point here is only that the problems associated with expert 
testimony, particularly expert testimony from a psychiatrist, mean that the defense does not 
have an adequate means of curing the government-created prejudice resulting from involuntary 
medications. 
208. Jurors will be predisposed, however, to explain the defendant’s appearance and behavior 
not in terms of transient, environmental influences such as medication effects, but in terms of 
dispositional factors such as the defendant’s character or personality. Social psychologists have 
labeled this bias towards dispositional explanations of the behavior of others the “fundamental 
attribution error.” See Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific 
Expert Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
267, 279 (2001) (noting that the fundamental attribution error “causes individuals to incorrectly 
perceive that another’s behavior is based on stable dispositions (i.e., traits) rather than situ-
ational contexts”). For a detailed discussion of the psychological research, see LEE ROSS & 
RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
(1991). Furthermore, overcoming this cognitive bias towards dispositional attributions, and con-
vincing jurors to attribute a defendant’s appearance and behavior to an unstable and external 
factor such as medication, is likely to be difficult because of belief perseverance, another cogni-
tive bias. See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instruc-
tions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial 
Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 691 (2000) (“Re-
search in the area of belief perseverance has demonstrated that once individuals form a belief, 
the belief becomes highly resistant to change and influences how they perceive and construct 
future information.”). For a discussion of the psychological research, see Lee Ross & Craig A. 
Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Errone-
ous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 144, 144-52 
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).  
209. See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983): 
The ability to present expert testimony describing the effect of medication on 
the defendant is not an adequate substitute. At best, such testimony would 
serve only to mitigate the unfair prejudice which may accrue to the defendant 
as a consequence of his controlled outward appearance. It cannot compensate 
for the positive value to the defendant’s case of his own demeanor in an un-
medicated condition.[;] 
see also State v. Posby, 574 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (finding expert testimony 
insufficient to compensate for the lost value of allowing the jury to observe defendant unmedi-
cated). 
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fense the opportunity to present its evidence: the defendant in a 
nondrug-altered state.210  
Additionally, jurors cannot reasonably be expected to disre-
gard the days or perhaps weeks that they observed the defendant 
sitting before them sedated and drooling, or agitated and twitch-
ing,211 or that they listened to the defendant testify about the crime 
in a rational and disinterested manner.212 As the Supreme Court 
suggested in Bruton v. United States, the ability to follow some in-
structions is simply beyond the practical, human limitations of the 
jury system.213 The Supreme Court also has held that, on appeal, 
some defects are not subject to harmless error analysis but require 
automatic reversal.214 These “structural errors”215 cannot be consid-
ered harmless both because “it is so difficult to measure their ef-
fects on a jury’s decision,”216 and because they “undermin[e] the 
                                                                                                                       
210. Cf. 2 LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 160, § 27.6(d), at 471 (“[M]ost errors at 
trial . . . relate to the introduction or evaluation of particular items of evidence.”). 
211. Events that are isolated are less likely to produce incurable prejudice than events that 
are extended. Compare United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 242 (1940) (hold-
ing that the prosecutor’s statements, though apparently improper, were not prejudicial because 
they were “isolated, casual episodes”), with Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976) 
(“[T]he constant reminder of the accused’s condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable 
attire may affect a juror’s judgment. The defendant’s clothing is so likely to be a continuing in-
fluence throughout the trial that . . . an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors 
coming into play.” (emphasis added)). The effects and side effects of antipsychotic drugs are 
discussed supra Part III.A. 
212. See supra notes 157, 181-82 and accompanying text (discussing how antipsychotic drugs 
affect a defendant’s testimony). 
213. According to the standard suggested by the Supreme Court in Bruton, prejudice is in-
curable when “the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the 
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the 
jury system cannot be ignored.” 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).   
214. The Supreme Court first decided that a violation of the Constitution could be “harmless” 
in the 1967 case of Chapman v. California. See 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (finding that a violation of 
the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent could be harmless, if the government 
established “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained”). Violations of most but not all constitutional rights are now subject to harm-
less-error analysis. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (“Although most constitu-
tional errors have been held amenable to harmless-error analysis, some will always invalidate 
the conviction.” (citations omitted)).  
215. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (describing a structural defect as 
“affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial 
process itself”). 
216. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 743 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (noting that “when a petit jury has been selected 
upon improper criteria or has been exposed to prejudicial publicity, we have required reversal of 
the conviction because the effect of the violation cannot be ascertained”); 2 LAFAVE, ISRAEL & 
KING, supra note 160, § 27.6(d), at 471 (“Undoubtedly the characteristic of violations requiring 
automatic reversal that is most frequently mentioned by the Supreme Court is the ‘inherently 
indeterminate’ impact of the violation upon the outcome of the trial.”). 
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structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself.”217 Conversely, 
potentially harmless “trial defects” are those that “occur[ ] during 
the presentation of the case to the jury.”218 In Riggins, the Supreme 
Court suggested that compelling a defendant to take psychotropic 
medications is not subject to harmless error analysis.219 For the 
same reasons that the prejudice resulting from administering in-
voluntary psychotropic medications cannot be considered harmless 
after trial, this prejudice cannot be cured during trial: because al-
tering the defendant’s demeanor will affect the jury in ways that 
are difficult, if not impossible, to describe precisely, yet are almost 
certain to influence the jury’s verdict in one way or another, neither 
the instructions of a judge, the testimony of witnesses, nor the in-
troduction of any other kind of evidence can, with adequate cer-
tainty, cure the prejudice resulting from the defendant’s drug-
induced demeanor. 
3. Altered Evidence of Mental State 
 The impact of involuntary psychotropic medications on a de-
fendant’s ability to present evidence in support of a claim that he 
was insane at the time of the offense is also an evidentiary problem 
that might potentially be cured by jury instructions or additional 
evidence. Perhaps the most obvious means of compensating for the 
loss of evidence that occurs when an irrational, psychotic detainee 
is medicated into a rational, competent defendant220 would be to 
                                                                                                                       
217. Olano, 507 U.S. at 743 (quoting Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263-64). 
218.  Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08 (defining “trial error” as “error which occurred during 
the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in 
the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
219. 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992) (indicating that “[e]fforts to prove or disprove actual prejudice 
from the record before us would be futile, and guesses whether the outcome of the trial might 
have been different if Riggins’[s] motion had been granted would be purely speculative” and “the 
precise consequences of forcing antipsychotic medication upon Riggins cannot be shown from a 
trial transcript” (citations omitted)); see also Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d 669, 669 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“[The case of] Riggins v. Nevada . . . held that harmless error analysis should not be applied 
where the defendant had been involuntarily medicated throughout the trial.”); Rickman v. Dut-
ton, 864 F. Supp. 686, 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (holding that “because efforts to prove or disprove 
actual prejudice from the record before the Court would be ‘futile,’ and the precise consequences 
of compelling Rickman to take mind-numbing drugs ‘cannot be shown from a trial transcript,’ the 
Court is foreclosed from conducting harmless error review” (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137)). 
220. Of course, that a defendant is rational at trial does not mean that he was sane (or in-
sane) at the time of the crime. However, a jury may well find it harder to believe that a defen-
dant who looks sane at trial was insane at the time of the crime. See supra notes 183-86 and 
accompanying text. Additionally, the manner and substance of the defendant’s testimony at trial 
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present to the jury some kind of record, such as a videotape, of the 
defendant made prior to initiating medication.221 Relying on a 
videotape to enable the defense to present evidence of insanity, 
however, raises several concerns. First, if a detainee’s best evidence 
supporting an insanity defense will be a videotape, then the tape 
becomes very important. Perhaps defense counsel should be present 
while the tape is being made, to ask those questions that will most 
fully reveal the detainee’s insanity.222 But, if defense counsel can 
question the detainee, then the prosecutor will likely want to ques-
tion him as well. Arguably, if attorneys for the defense and the 
prosecution are questioning the detainee, the detainee is being tried 
while incompetent.223 Further, what if the detainee refuses to coop-
erate? Will this be held against him, even though he is incompetent 
to stand trial? Arguably, any policy whereby an incompetent de-
tainee can preserve the ability to present a defense only by produc-
ing an evidentiary record of his unmedicated mental state is incon-
sistent with the principle that a defendant cannot be tried unless 
he is able to participate in defending himself.224 
Another means by which a medicated defendant might sup-
port a defense of insanity is discontinuing the medications for a 
brief period during trial. Although a few courts have granted a de-
fendant’s request to discontinue involuntary psychotropic medica-
                                                                                                                       
about his mental state at the time of the crime can influence whether the jury believes he was 
insane at the time of the crime. See supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text. 
221. See United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) 
(“[A]n effective insanity defense might be presented through the testimony of Dr. Johnson, per-
haps assisted by videotapes of Weston. On remand, therefore, the district court should review the 
tapes to determine whether they show Weston in his delusional state, and if so, whether, when 
combined with psychiatric testimony, they would enable defense counsel to mount an effective 
insanity defense.”). 
222. Courts have generally held that a psychiatric evaluation, when requested by the prose-
cution for the purpose of obtaining evidence with which to counter the defendant’s claim of insan-
ity, is not a “critical stage” entitling the defendant to the presence of counsel. See Buchanan v. 
Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 424-25 (1987) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require the 
presence of defense counsel during a prosecutor-requested psychiatric evaluation, so long as 
defense counsel is “informed about the scope and nature of the proceeding” and “the possible uses 
to which petitioner’s statements in the proceeding could be put”). A videotaped session that 
would be the basis for the defendant’s entire defense, however, is arguably a “critical stage.” Cf. 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (defining a “critical stage” as a proceeding 
“where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere for-
mality”). 
223. On the other hand, the absence of court involvement in the making of the tape might re-
sult in questions about the tape’s admissibility. See State v. Santos, 902 P.2d 510, 517 (Mont. 
1995) (holding trial court was justified in refusing to admit videotapes of the defendant in an 
unmedicated state in part because “[t]he probative value of the videotapes is suspect considering 
the circumstances under which they were made, including that Santos was not under oath”).   
224. See supra note 8 (discussing competency to stand trial). 
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tions during at least part of the trial,225 this means of attempting to 
overcome the prejudice caused by these medications is risky. No 
way exists for predicting a defendant’s behavior while unmedicated, 
and the defendant may become incompetent and may remain in-
competent even when medications are again administered.226 Also, 
discontinuing the medications does not necessarily mean that even 
a previously psychotic defendant will experience a recurrence of 
psychotic symptoms, or if psychotic symptoms do recur, that they 
will be the same psychotic symptoms the defendant experienced at 
the time of the offense.227 Finally, this option is only even theoreti-
cally possible when involuntary medications are not justified by the 
defendant’s dangerousness, given the government’s interest in pro-
tecting the safety of the defendant and the people around the de-
fendant, both in and out of the courtroom.228  
B. Judicial Assessment of Medication Effects Cannot Protect   
Against an Unfair Trial 
Some courts seem to assume that any prejudice caused by 
psychotropic medications will be addressed as a competency to 
stand trial issue.229 The standard for assessing competency to stand 
                                                                                                                       
225. E.g., State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.H. 1978) (ruling that “the trial court may 
compel the defendant to be under medication at least four weeks prior to trial . . . if at some time 
during the trial, assuming the defendant so requests the jury views him without medication for 
as long as he is found to have been without it at the time of the crime”). 
226. See Richard Jed Wyatt, Neuroleptics and the Natural Course of Schizophrenia, 17 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 325, 325 (1991) (noting that “there is evidence that stable schizophrenic 
patients whose neuroleptics are discontinued and have relapses may have a difficult time return-
ing to their previous level of function”). 
227. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 345 (“Neuroleptic withdrawal can be followed by psy-
chotic exacerbation or relapse, although not all patients relapse after medication withdrawal.”). 
228. See supra note 24 (discussing government’s parens patriae and police power interests in 
preventing harm). While handcuffing or otherwise restraining a defendant in the courtroom 
might diminish the defendant’s dangerousness, compelling a defendant to appear before the jury 
in physical restraints presents its own problems. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text. 
229. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 264 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that if ren-
dered competent by involuntary medication, the defendant “would not simply be thrust into the 
courtroom for trial without additional procedural protections” but that “he would be statutorily 
entitled to have a district judge conduct a pretrial examination of his competency to stand trial”); 
see also William P. Ziegelmueller, Note, Sixth Amendment—Due Process on Drugs: The Implica-
tions of Forcibly Medicating Pretrial Detainees with Antipsychotic Drugs: Riggins v. Nevada, 112 
S. Ct. 1810 (1992), 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 836, 865 (1993) (arguing that the majority 
opinion in Riggins “ignored the fact that a defendant on antipsychotic drugs must still be compe-
tent to stand trial. The test to determine competency specifically determines if the defendant has 
the cognitive capability to consult with her lawyer and follow the proceedings against her—the 
very abilities the Court believed could be affected by antipsychotic drugs.”). A court is required to 
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trial is not, however, adequate for preventing violations of the right 
to a fair trial when the defendant is compelled to take psychotropic 
drugs during trial. Courts interpret the competency to stand trial 
standard very narrowly, as requiring only a basic cognitive ability 
to understand and assist in the proceedings.230 This narrow inter-
pretation means that drug-induced impairments in a defendant’s 
emotional, motivational, attentional, or behavioral ability to par-
ticipate are unlikely even to trigger a review of the defendant’s 
competency to stand trial, much less support a finding of incompe-
tence.231  
Several courts have suggested that in addition to the usual 
competency to stand trial review, a broader judicial assessment of 
the medication effects and side effects experienced by the defendant 
can protect the trial rights of a defendant to whom the government 
is administering involuntary medications.232 What sort of standard 
                                                                                                                       
investigate any bona fide doubts about the defendant’s competency, at any time during the trial. 
See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-87 (1966).   
230. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993) (“Requiring that a criminal defendant 
be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the 
proceedings and to assist counsel.”); see also GARY MELTON, JOHN PETRILA, NORMAN POYTHRESS 
& CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 122 (1997) (noting 
that “most observers agree that the threshold for a finding of competency is not particularly 
high”). Arguably, this standard does what it is supposed to do in most cases: it ensures that the 
defendant has a sufficient understanding of the trial process to allow him to participate in pre-
senting a defense. See supra note 8. This standard cannot, however, guard against an unfair trial 
when the government, at the same time that it is prosecuting the defendant, is administering 
medications known to impair the ability to present a defense. See supra Part III.B (discussing 
ways that involuntary psychotropic medications interfere with the ability to present a defense). 
231. Courts are likely to allow a trial to proceed despite evidence of significant impairment 
caused by psychotropic medications, provided the impairment does not include an inability to 
understand the trial process. See, e.g., McGregor v. Gibson, 219 F.3d 1245, 1252, 1259 n.3, 1261 
(10th Cir. 2000) (finding that defendant’s “conduct and demeanor at trial were not so bizarre and 
irrational as to raise a bona fide doubt that he was incompetent,” when defendant may have been 
overmedicated and defense attorney indicated that defendant “talked nonsense the whole time” 
and hindered efforts to present a defense); State v. Mitchell, 727 N.E.2d 254, 269 (Ill. 2000) (em-
phasizing that motivational or attentional side effects of psychotropic medications do not raise a 
bona fide doubt regarding competency; and that competency requires only that defendant’s cog-
nitive abilities not be substantially impaired: “[Consultant’s] affidavit established that the com-
bination of defendant’s medications might have affected defendant’s ability to make certain deci-
sions . . . [and] may have caused defendant to appear too relaxed or detached during court pro-
ceedings. [The] affidavit simply does not establish that defendant would not have been able to 
understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or to assist in his defense.”); Common-
wealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Mass. 1983) (concluding defendant was competent to 
stand trial even though the symptoms of schizophrenia were only “controlled to some extent” by 
“heavy” doses of antipsychotics, which “reduced the defendant’s alertness and ability to concen-
trate”).  
232. E.g., United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) 
(stating that involuntary medications might be acceptable “provided that, should Weston become 
competent to stand trial, the district court conducts a second hearing to determine the extent to 
which any side effects Weston is actually experiencing might affect his fair trial rights”); United 
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a court should apply to evaluate whether the prejudicial effects of 
involuntary psychotropic drugs are within some acceptable range is, 
however, something of a mystery. How sedated is too sedated to re-
ceive effective assistance of counsel? How distracted is too dis-
tracted to confront witnesses? How anxious is too anxious to convey 
credibility? The problem, it should be emphasized, is not the defen-
dant’s sedation, distractedness, or anxiety per se, but rather the 
government action of causing the defendant to be sedated, dis-
tracted, or anxious.233 Also, a court would almost certainly have 
great difficulty determining whether a particular defendant was 
sedated, distracted, or anxious because of the effects and side ef-
fects of involuntary medications, or because of some other factor, 
such as residual symptoms of the defendant’s mental illness or the 
defendant’s personality.234 Finally, the effects and side effects of 
                                                                                                                       
States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 137 (D.D.C. 2001) (“The Court will reassess, upon request, 
its determination regarding the prejudice to Weston’s fair trial rights resulting from medication 
when testimony about the actual, not hypothetical, impact of the medication is available.”); Mor-
gan, 193 F.3d at 264-65 (“The district judge might also ensure that the medication posed no 
significant risk of altering or impairing Morgan’s demeanor in a manner that would prejudice his 
capacity or willingness to either react to testimony at trial or to assist his counsel.”). 
233. In Weston, Judge Tatel, responding to Judge Henderson’s suggestion that the inability 
of an involuntarily medicated defendant to present evidence of insanity is no different from a 
defendant’s inability to recreate a state of “heat of passion” for the jury, stressed that the critical 
factor is whether the inability results from government action: 
To be sure, due process does not require that a defendant presenting a “heat of 
passion” defense “duplicate his ‘hot blood’ in court.” But because such a case in-
volves no action by the government, it has nothing to do with the issue before 
us. Here the question is whether due process permits the government through 
involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs to alter the defendant so that 
it becomes impossible for him to appear before the jury as he was when he 
committed the crime. 
Weston, 206 F.3d at 21-22 (Tatel, J., concurring) (quoting Weston, 206 F.3d at 15 (Henderson, J., 
concurring)). 
Additionally, the “heat of passion” defense rests on a view of human nature as generally 
flawed, so that any reasonable person experiencing what the defendant experienced would have 
been similarly provoked. See State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Tenn. 1987) (setting aside 
first-degree murder conviction in favor of manslaughter because “[i]n our opinion the passions of 
any reasonable person would have been inflamed”); see also Glanville Williams, Provocation and 
the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 740, 742 (“Surely the true view of provocation is that it 
is a concession to ‘the frailty of human nature’ in those exceptional cases where the legal prohibi-
tion fails of effect.”), quoted in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 164, at 408. The insanity 
defense, on the other hand, excuses someone whose experience of the world is so distorted that 
he does not realize when he is killing someone else, or does not realize that killing someone else 
is wrong. See M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843) (establishing the traditional defini-
tion of insanity). Arguably, from the typical juror’s point of view, it is much easier to imagine 
being provoked enough to kill someone than it is to imagine being insane enough to kill someone. 
Consequently, the inability to demonstrate to the jury a state of insanity is arguably more costly 
to a defendant than is an inability to demonstrate a state of “heat of passion.” 
234. See supra notes 198, 204 (discussing the problem of distinguishing medication effects 
from other factors that could explain the defendant’s appearance and behavior). 
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antipsychotic medications are so extensive that arguably the rights 
of every defendant who takes these medications will be affected in 
some way or another.235 For example, if the defendant experiences 
extrapyramidal side effects and appears nervous,236 then the jury 
may conclude that he lacks credibility;237 on the other hand, if the 
defendant experiences no side effects and appears perfectly sane,238 
then the jury may be unable to believe that he suffered from a men-
tal abnormality at the time of the offense.239  
V. THE BOTTOM LINE: CIVIL COMMITMENT RATHER THAN 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
The inability to cure the prejudice caused by psychotropic 
medications means that courts should not allow the government to 
compel a defendant to take these medications during trial. The con-
clusion that administering involuntary psychotropic medications 
during trial violates the defendant’s right to a fair trial might be 
criticized for giving an incompetent detainee the option of not pro-
ceeding to trial, by refusing to take voluntarily the psychotropic 
drugs that might render him competent.240 The detainee’s “choice,” 
                                                                                                                       
235. See supra Part III.B (discussing ways that antipsychotic medications infringe rights at 
trial).  
236. See supra notes 118-20, 132 and accompanying text (discussing extrapyramidal side ef-
fects of antipsychotic medications). 
237. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing impact of side effects on jury’s 
assessment of defendant’s credibility). 
238. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting some patients’ “wakening” response 
to antipsychotic medications). 
239. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text (discussing impact of antipsychotic medi-
cation on the ability to present evidence in support of insanity defense). This problem exists not 
only for defendants asserting a traditional insanity defense but also for defendants asserting 
defenses such as partial responsibility and diminished capacity. See supra notes 168-69 and 
accompanying text (discussing partial responsibility and diminished capacity defenses). 
240. On the other hand, the present system forces an incompetent detainee to choose be-
tween receiving treatment for his mental illness and receiving a fair adjudication of the charges 
against him. Additionally, not all incompetent detainees will refuse psychotropic medications. 
Particularly for detainees charged with relatively nonserious crimes, the prospect of a trial may 
be more desirable than the prospect of indefinite civil commitment. When antipsychotic drugs 
were first introduced, some courts initially found detainees incompetent to stand trial if their 
competency was maintained by medication; some of these detainees appealed, seeking to be able 
to proceed to trial. E.g., State v. Hampton, 218 So.2d 311, 312 (La. 1969) (finding on appeal by 
defendant that trial court erred in ruling that “trial capacity induced by medication was insuffi-
cient”); People v. Dalfonso, 321 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (agreeing with defendant’s 
argument that he was “competent to stand trial even though his competency may depend upon 
taking the prescribed medication, Haldol”); see also Steve Tomashefsky, Comment, Antipsychotic 
Drugs and Fitness to Stand Trial: The Right of the Unfit Accused to Refuse Treatment, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 773, 791 (1985) (“[I]t should not be assumed that a defendant is automatically better off 
being found unfit to stand trial than being tried. The early litigation over fitness produced by 
antipsychotic drugs was instigated by defendants who preferred a trial to indefinite commit-
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however, is not between trial and release. If a detainee refuses to 
take psychotropic medications voluntarily, then the government can 
seek to hold the detainee under civil commitment laws.241 Different 
jurisdictions have different criteria for civil commitment, yet all 
provide in some way for the detention of someone who is a danger to 
himself or others because of a mental illness.242 Some statutes are 
even specifically designed to address the problem of the “perma-
nently incompetent” detainee, who cannot be brought to trial.243 For 
example, federal law allows for the indefinite commitment of an 
incompetent detainee “against whom all criminal charges have been 
dismissed solely for reasons related to the mental condition of the 
person” if the detainee “is presently suffering from a mental disease 
or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial 
risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to prop-
erty of another.”244  Thus, although not all incompetent detainees 
who refuse medication will satisfy the requirements for civil com-
mitment, the government should have the greatest ability to hold 
                                                                                                                       
ment.”). Even those who have been convicted may not prefer involuntary psychiatric treatment 
over regular penal confinement. See generally Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (involving a 
convicted felon’s objection to being transferred from the state prison to a mental hospital). Addi-
tionally, when an incompetent detainee is charged with a relatively minor crime, the prosecutor 
may be sympathetic to some resolution of the charge, such as entering a nolle prosequi, so that 
the detainee can receive appropriate treatment. Problems arise when the detainee is charged 
with a serious crime, because the public pressure to obtain a conviction may diminish the prose-
cutor’s willingness to take any action other than to proceed to trial. Interview with Karl Dean, 
former Public Defender and present Director of Law for Metropolitan Nashville, in Nashville, 
Tenn. (Nov. 15, 2001).  
241. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (noting that one of the government’s 
options when a detainee cannot be rendered competent to stand trial is to “institute the custom-
ary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citi-
zen”); cf. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 145 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“If the State cannot render the defendant competent without involuntary medication, then it 
must resort to civil commitment, if appropriate, unless the defendant becomes competent 
through other means.”). 
242. See REISNER, SLOBOGIN & RAI, supra note 170, at 641 (discussing civil commitment 
statutes). 
243. Usually, a detainee is “permanently incompetent” because his incompetence results 
from a mental disorder that cannot be treated. “[I]f there is no substantial probability that the 
defendant will regain trial competence in the near future . . . the state can only justify further 
detention through the use of its regular civil commitment proceedings. The incompetent defen-
dant is then viewed as permanently incompetent, not as potentially restorable.” Grant H. Morris 
& J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompe-
tent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 13 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
244. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998); see also United States v. Sahhar, 56 F.3d 1026, 
1029-30 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of § 4246, on the grounds that it “is nar-
rowly tailored to apply only to a particular concern of the federal government: dangerous persons 
charged with federal crimes but found incompetent to stand trial”), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 952 
(1995). 
2002] TRIAL RIGHTS AND PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS 215 
those detainees who pose the greatest risk of engaging in criminal 
activity if released.245 If the government cannot hold a detainee who 
is so seriously mentally ill as to not satisfy the very minimal re-
quirements for competency to stand trial,246 and who, probable 
cause exists to believe, is endangering himself and others by engag-
ing in criminal activity, then arguably the solution should be to 
change the civil commitment laws, not to compromise constitutional 
guarantees of fairness for the sake of obtaining a criminal convic-
tion. Furthermore, the difficult questions247 that arise when the 
government seeks to administer involuntary psychotropic drugs to 
an incompetent pretrial detainee might well be avoided altogether, 
in at least some cases, by a different kind of change in the civil 
commitment laws: enhancing the government’s ability to adminis-
ter involuntary psychotropic drugs to a mentally ill person before 
he commits a crime.248   
                                                                                                                       
245. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 243, at 22 (“Throughout the United States, a mentally 
disordered person who is dangerous to others is subject to civil commitment. In a civil commit-
ment proceeding, proof that a permanently incompetent defendant recently engaged in serious 
activity endangering others should suffice for an order of commitment.”). Additionally, if the 
requirements for civil commitment are not met, the government may in extreme cases seek to 
continue holding the detainee under an alternate exercise of the government’s police power in-
terest in protecting the safety of the public. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 
(1987) (“We have repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in community safety 
can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.”). 
246. See supra note 8 (discussing competency to stand trial); see also supra notes 230-31 and 
accompanying text (stressing that the requirements for competence to stand trial are minimal). 
247. See supra Part II (discussing difficulty courts have encountered in determining when 
the government may administer involuntary medications); see also United States v. Weston, 206 
F.3d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Rogers, J., concurring) (“[N]otwithstanding the district court’s com-
mendable effort to get a handle on a difficult issue, the district court made insufficient findings 
and did not consider all of the factors.”); State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 971 (Conn. 1975) (indicat-
ing that “the trial court made an admirable attempt, in the absence of guidance on this complex 
issue, to balance the interests of the defendant and the state before issuing the medication or-
der”). 
248. See Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with Serious 
Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 
1285 (2000) (“Numerous studies conclude that persons suffering from mental illness who follow 
prescribed medication regimens, or are properly treated, are significantly less dangerous than 
those who are not treated or who are noncompliant with prescribed medication regimens.”); E. 
Fuller Torrey, M.D., Violent Behavior by Individuals with Serious Mental Illness, 45 HOSP. & 
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 653, 659 (1994) (“The data, then, suggest that individuals with serious 
mental illnesses are not more dangerous than the general population when they are taking their 
antipsychotic medication. When they are not taking their medication, the existing data suggest 
that some of them are more dangerous.”); Letters from Nobody: The Shadow of Russell Weston, 
Jr., ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug. 8, 2001, at B8 (commenting on the possibility of imposing 
the death penalty in the Weston case): 
If society can forcibly medicate a man to kill him, why can’t it forcibly medicate 
a man to save him? Why did John Gibson and Jacob Chestnut have to give up 
their lives before the law stepped in? Why are we debating the absurdist, the 
Kafkaesque, question of whether to make a man sane enough to kill him, or to 
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Civil commitment does not, of course, achieve the same in-
terests as does a criminal conviction.249 The two primary interests 
that the government can achieve through criminal convictions are 
retribution and deterrence.250 These particular interests are not 
well served, however, by the conviction of someone who has been 
denied a fair opportunity to defend himself. The theory of retribu-
tion is based on the principle that a defendant who is convicted of a 
crime deserves to be punished.251 This principle presumes, however, 
that the defendant deserved to be convicted, a presumption that is 
not warranted when the defendant did not receive a fair trial. Simi-
larly, the government could obtain more convictions, and thereby 
deter more potential criminals, by compromising the procedural 
protections afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.252 That 
these amendments grant to criminal defendants such rights as the 
right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, and to confront 
witnesses—rights that certainly tend to impair rather than enhance 
the government’s ability to obtain convictions and deter crime—
indicates that deterrence cannot be achieved, legitimately at 
least,253 by sacrificing a basic level of fairness.  
While most defendants can be tried according to the rules of 
fairness established by the Constitution, in some cases these rules 
will preclude bringing a defendant to trial, because the trial would 
lack a basic level of fairness. Thus, for example, the inability to 
render a detainee competent to stand trial does not justify bringing 
the detainee to trial while he is incompetent.254  Similarly, the in-
ability to bring a defendant to trial if the court suppresses the de-
fendant’s coerced confession, or evidence obtained by the police in 
                                                                                                                       
leave him to his madness? Isn’t there some other way, some sane way to treat 
the insane? Or has society gone mad, too? 
249. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
250. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (observing that “punishment 
serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence” (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144, 168 (1963))). 
251. See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER 
AND EMOTIONS 179 (F. Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Retributivism is the view that punishment is justi-
fied by the moral culpability of those who receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and only 
because, the offender deserves it.”), quoted in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 164, at 106. 
252. The protections guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are discussed supra 
Part III.B. 
253. Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985) (“[A] state may not legitimately assert an 
interest in maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage 
is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained.”) 
254. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (“The State concedes that the conviction 
of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process.” (citing Bishop v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956))). 
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an illegal search, does not justify admitting the coerced confes-
sion255 or the illegally obtained evidence.256  Finally, maintaining a 
basic level of fairness is an interest of the government as well as of 
defendants.257 Convicting a defendant after an unfair trial not only 
harms the individual defendant but also compromises the integrity 
of the criminal justice system as a whole.258 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In deciding whether to allow the government to administer 
involuntary psychotropic medications to an incompetent pretrial 
detainee, a court must consider multiple interests of both the gov-
ernment and the detainee. Either way that a court decides, the abil-
ity to achieve certain of these interests will be limited, if not fore-
closed altogether. If the court decides not to allow involuntary 
medications, the government will likely be unable to achieve its in-
terest in adjudicating the charges against the detainee. The gov-
ernment also might need to pursue civil commitment to achieve its 
interests in protecting the health and safety of the detainee and 
others. On the other hand, if the court decides to allow involuntary 
medications, the detainee’s ability to exercise procedural rights at 
trial will likely be diminished. Also, the detainee’s demeanor as 
well as his mental state are likely to be altered by the medications, 
in ways that detract both from the jury’s impression of the de-
                                                                                                                       
255. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964) (observing that “[i]t is now axiomatic 
that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, 
in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession”); see also Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 
568 (1958) (“[T]he admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the 
judgment because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
256. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by 
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in 
a state court.”). 
257. See United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[A] drug that nega-
tively affects [the defendant’s] demeanor in court or ability to participate in his own defense will 
not satisfy the government’s goal of a fair trial.” (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 143-44 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (emphasis added)); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
849 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting “the established principle that the interest of the 
State in a criminal prosecution ‘is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done’ ” 
(quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))). 
258. See United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 288 (S.D. Ala. 1906) (charging the jury that 
convicting an incompetent defendant would be worse than allowing a competent defendant to go 
unpunished because, in convicting an incompetent defendant, “the great safeguards which the 
law adopts in the punishment of crime and the upholding of justice would be rudely invaded by 
the tribunal whose sacred duty it is to uphold the law in all its integrity”), quoted in Cooper v. 
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 366 (1996). 
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tainee’s character and credibility and from his ability to present 
evidence in support of an insanity defense.  
These infringements of the detainee’s interests create a sub-
stantial risk that a detainee to whom the government is administer-
ing involuntary psychotropic medications will not receive a fair 
trial. Because the detainee cannot be tried with a reasonable cer-
tainty of fairness, he cannot be tried at all. This is true regardless 
of the magnitude of the government interests that will not be 
achieved because the detainee will not be brought to trial; the in-
ability to conduct a trial fairly does not justify conducting a trial 
unfairly. As important as the government’s interests in adjudica-
tion undeniably are, they cannot justify violating a detainee’s right 
not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law.259 If the 
government is considered not to violate due process by bringing a 
detainee to trial while simultaneously compelling him to take psy-
chotropic medications—medications that will impair his ability to 
confront witnesses against him, for example, or will detract from a 
jury’s perception of his credibility, or will alter the content of his 
testimony—then for this detainee, the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, along with much of the Sixth 
Amendment, have become essentially meaningless. 
 
Dora W. Klein* 
 
                                                                                                                       
259. If the defendant is charged with a capital offense, administering involuntary psychotro-
pic medications can also violate the right not to be deprived of life without due process of law. See 
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[S]erious prejudice could 
result if medication inhibits the defendant’s capacity to react and respond to the proceedings and 
to demonstrate remorse or compassion. . . . In a capital sentencing proceeding, assessments of 
character and remorse may carry great weight and, perhaps, be determinative of whether the 
offender lives or dies.” (citing William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life 
or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 51-53 
(1987-1988))).  
*  For commenting on various drafts, as well as providing advice and moral support, thanks 
to Rebecca Brown, Nancy King, and Thomas McCoy at Vanderbilt University Law School;    
Deborah Denno at Fordham University School of Law; and Patricia Farren at Cahill, Gordon & 
Reindel. For insights into the real world of the criminal trial process, thanks to Karl Dean, for-
mer Public Defender and present Director of Law for the metropolitan government of Nashville. 
Finally, thanks to the members of the Vanderbilt Law Review, not only for work on this Note but 
also for steady friendship (and occasional commiseration) over the past two years. 
